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Summary 
This thesis consists of four main chapters, together with a general introduction and 
conclusion. The thesis examines, both separately and together, the formation of trade 
blocs and global market integration. All the models use a partial equilibrium 
framework, with firms competing as Coumot oligopolists. 
Chapter 2 presents two models of trade bloc formation under segmented markets. In 
the first model, with common constant marginal costs, global free trade is optimal for 
all countries when there are no more than four countries, but with five or more 
countries there is an incentive to form a trade bloc containing most countries, but 
excluding at least one. The second model introduces a cost function where a firm's 
marginal cost is lower when it is located in a larger trade bloc, with little effect on the 
results. Chapter 3 analyses the formation of trade blocs between countries with 
different market sizes under segmented markets. The formation of a two country 
customs union or free trade area will always raise the smaller country's welfare, while 
the larger country will usually lose from a free trade area, and sometimes from a 
customs union. 
Chapter 4, which is joint work with David R. Collie and Morten Hviid, presents a 
model of strategic trade policy under integrated markets, under complete and 
incomplete information. In the former case, a low cost country will give an export 
subsidy which is fully countervailed by the high cost country's import tariff. In the 
simultaneous signalling game, each country's expected welfare is higher than under 
free trade. Chapter 5 considers models of trade bloc formation under integrated 
markets. With common constant costs, there is no incentive for blocs to fonn. When 
costs are decreasing in membership of a bloc, either global free trade is optimal or 




1.1 General introduction and motivation 
This thesis contains four main chapters which examine, both separately and 
together, the formation of trade blocs and global market integration. As is argued in 
this introduction, these are two important issues facing the world trading system 
today, but despite their significance there are many important implications of both 
which are not well understood and are not considered by existing theoretical models. 
Throughout the thesis a partial equilibrium approach, in which firms compete as 
Cournot oligopolists, is taken, following much of the literature on strategic trade 
policy. 
In recent years there has been much talk about both globalisation and 
regionalisation within the world trading system. The first of these tenns encapsulates 
the idea that the world is in some way becoming smaller. In the context of trade, this 
is largely because improvements in transport and communications have reduced 
transactions costs and increased transparency where price differences exist between 
markets. Meanwhile the process of regionalisation suggests that neighbouring 
countries are becoming integrated at a faster rate than countries which are further 
apart. Both these factors are modelled in this thesis, the former by analysing trade 
policy under integrated markets and the latter by examining the causes and 
consequences of trade bloc formation. An additional factor which might arise from the 
process of regional integration is a fall in the costs facing firms within a trade bloc, 
which is included in some models in this thesis. 
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The recent rise in the importance of trade blocs, taken here to mean any form 
of trade agreement such as a customs union or free trade area which involves the 
1.11, abolition of tariffs between its members, is an issue which is currently of great 
concern to both trade theorists and policy makers. As of May 1998, almost 180 
regional trade agreements had been reported to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
a third of them since 1990, and all WTO members except Japan, Hong Kong and 
'V- 
Kbrea belonged to at least one. ' The formation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and successive expansions of the European Union (EU) and 
European Economic Area (EEA), in particular, have led to much debate about the 
advantages and disadvantages, to both member countries and the world as a whole, of 
such arrangements. A comprehensive overview of the debate is provided by 
Panagariya (1998). Among the major issues are the effects of the formation and 
expansion of trade blocs on members' and non-members' tariff rates and welfare, and 
the relationship between regional and multilateral free trade. This thesis does not 
address the latter set of issues, but contributes to the discussion on the former. This 
literature was largely inspired by Krugman's (1991) monopolistic competition model 
of symmetric customs unions, which suggested that global welfare would be 
minimised when the world was divided into three customs unions. However other 
papers (Bond and Syropoulos (1995,1996), Sinclair and Vines (1994)) have shown 
that this result is not robust to changes in factors such as countries' endowments, the 
type of trade bloc and the nature of competition. 
I Financial Times, 18 May 1998. 
3 
All the models mentioned above assume symmetry between countries and 
blocs, which is an assumption that the models in this thesis move away from. 
Although the assumption of symmetry between blocs allows for many clear results to 
be obtained concerning the effects of changes in the size and number of blocs, the 
question of whether a symmetric bloc structure is a plausible equilibrium is not 
generally addressed. In addition, these models are likely to miss important effects 
arising from different bloc sizes, such as a possible increase in market power for a 
large bloc, relative to a smaller bloc, when setting its tariff rate. The assumption of 
symmetry between countries also limits the insights which can be gained from models 
of trade bloc formation. Although this assumption can simplify the analysis of bloc 
formation and leads to many clear and interesting results, some real life events, such 
as the fonnation of NAFTA, cannot be explained in such a context. 
At first it was widely believed that the proliferation of regional trade 
agreements was related to fears about the future of multilateral trade reforms, as there 
were major doubts as to whether the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations would be 
successfully completed. However, the trend towards regionalism does not appear to 
have subsided since the completion of the Round, suggesting that there are benefits to 
be achieved from trade bloc membership within a stable multilateral system. 2 Three of 
the chapters in this thesis develop models of trade bloc formation in which firms 
compete as Cournot oligopolists, following in the tradition of much of the literature 
on strategic trade policy (for example Brander and Spencer (1984,1985); the literature 
2 Although the perceived benefits from membership of a trade bloc might be non-economic, this thesis 
concentrates on the possible economic benefits. 
4 
on strategic trade policy is surveyed extensively in Brander (1995)). Some previous 
papers (Sinclair and Vines (1994), Collie (1997)) analyse the behaviour of trade blocs 
under Cournot oligopoly, but assume a symmetric bloc structure. Yi (1996) removes 
this assumption and instead considers the optimal structure of trade blocs. The models 
in Chapters 2 and 5 follow his approach closely. While assuming that countries are 
symmetric, trade blocs of different sizes are allowed to form using an equilibrium 
concept based on Yi's 'unanimous regionalism. ' Under this assumption, the existing 
members of a trade bloc must all agree before a new member can be admitted. Thus 
any trade bloc can prevent outsiders from joining. This seems more consistent with 
the observed behaviour of, for example, the EU and NAFTA than the alternative 
assumption of 'open regionalism', under which any country which desires entry to a 
trade bloc is free to join. 
A novel feature added to the models in Chapters 2 and 5 is consideration of 
the case in which increasing membership of a trade bloc can lower the marginal cost 
of fin-ns based in member countries. The assumption of common marginal costs is 
replaced by marginal costs decreasing in the size of the trade bloc in which the firm is 
based. Hence, when the world is divided into two asymmetric blocs, firms based in 
countries in the larger bloc have lower costs than firms located in the smaller bloc. 
There are a number of reasons why this might be true, including the harmonisation of 
standards and an increase in research joint ventures, but perhaps the most important 
cause, given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, is a likely fall in the cost of 
intermediate inputs arising from the abolition of tariffs on trade between partners. 
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The potential reduction in firms' costs due to trade bloc membership is an 
important effect which has generally been ignored in previous partial equilibrium 
models, although it has been recognised by policy makers. Many of the measures 
introduced under the EU's '1992' programme, in response to the Commission's 
report on The Costs of Non-Europe (Commission of the European Communities 
(1988)), were designed to both deepen regional integration and reduce the costs of 
firms located in member states. Among the costs identified by the report, customs 
procedures were estimated to cost around 8 billion ECU per year (1985 prices), with 
an effect equivalent to a tariff of 1.6% on intra-EU trade, while the cost of differing 
technical standards and regulations was estimated at 40 billion ECU per year. Hence 
there is a clear possibility that increased regional integration could have a significant 
effect in reducing costs faced by finns within Europe. 
While the two models presented in Chapters 2 and 5 assume, as in the 
previous literature dealing with trade blocs under imperfect competition, that 
countries are symmetric, there may be important effects arising from asymmetries 
between countries which cannot be accounted for by such models. Whereas a model 
with symmetric countries could provide an insight into the economic motivation 
behind certain trade blocs, such as the early European Economic Community or 
MERCOSUR, where countries are in many ways similar, other trade blocs clearly 
cannot be characterised as symmetric. For instance, NAFTA consists of three 
members (the United States, Canada and Mexico) which have vast differences in 
income and levels of development, while the eagerness of many Eastern European 
states to join the EU cannot be explained by a symmetric model. Hence Chapter 3 
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presents a framework for the analysis of the formation of trade blocs between 
asymmetric countries, where the asymmetry is characterised by differences in a 
demand parameter. This allows for an explanation of why a small country might wish 
to join a large partner in a free trade agreement or customs union, while also 
suggesting a reason for the existence of side agreements which accompany many such 
trade agreements, typically featuring concessions made by small countries to their 
larger partners on non-trade issues. 
The trend towards regionalism is one factor which could be associated with a 
move towards integrated markets. When Smith and Venables (1988) estimated the 
potential gains to European countries from the 1992 programme, one of the factors 
they considered was the possibility of a move from segmented to integrated markets. 
Taken together with the cost reducing effect of deeper integration, they showed that 
significant welfare gains were possible. With Cournot competition and no entry, a 
move to integrated markets raised the estimated welfare gain (as a percentage of EU 
consumption) from the 1992 measures from 0.63% to 2.61%. 3 
Although the evidence that markets are becoming more integrated is somewhat 
limited, a recent report by the European Commission (DG15 (1996)) finds some 
evidence of price convergence between countries, which is taken to be evidence of 
increasing integration. The greatest convergence has tended to occur in highly traded 
sectors, especially those where competition from outside the EU is significant, 
3 Other scenarios considered by Smith and Venables (198 8) assumed free entry and Bertrand 
competition. The equivalent figures for welfare gains, without and with a move to integrated markets, 
with free entry are 0.98% and 6.15%. With Bertrand competition, the change from segmented to 
integrated markets has no welfare effect. 
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suggesting that market integration is a global phenomenon rather than simply a 
regional one resulting from EU policy initiatives. The study also finds that price 
convergence is greater in markets characterised by homogeneous products. 
While regionalism and market integration are clearly linked to some extent, at 
the same time there are good reasons to believe that global markets are becoming 
more integrated independently of any regional effects. In recent decades there have 
been rapid improvements in transport and communications, meaning that transactions 
costs on trade have fallen while there is a greater awareness of differences in product 
availability and prices between markets. These factors suggest that the importance of 
geographical distance between markets is declining. In addition, the continuing 
development of Internet commerce means that many products are available to 
consumers around the world from a single source. Hence the assumption, common to 
most of the literature on strategic trade policy, that markets are nationally segmented 
is gradually becoming less tenable. In fact, many firms now regard the global 
economy as their market place, and such a situation calls for the analysis of trade 
policy in a single integrated world market rather than in segmented markets. The 
analysis of strategic trade policy under integrated markets is not widely understood 
with only a few papers (Markusen and Venables (1988), Venables (1994), Fisher and 
Wilson (1995), Collie (1998)) dealing with this case. Although the assumption of 
segmented markets, taken together with constant marginal costs, greatly simplifies the 
analysis of trade policy by allowing any country's market to be analysed 
independently of all other markets, this strategic independence between markets is 
increasingly unappealing given the current economic environment and the often 
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commented on trend towards globalisation. Although the alternative assumption of 
integrated markets, implying perfect arbitrage between countries, is also very strong, 
it is important to understand the similarities and differences between the two 
assumptions in the presence of increasing global economic integration. 
Integrated markets imply certain restrictions on the types of trade policy which 
can be used by governments. In general, subsidies used on their own are inconsistent 
with integrated markets as they allow profitable arbitrage opportunities, while import 
tariffs artificially segment markets. Hence the models in Chapters 4 and 5 use a trade 
policy instrument which combines an import tariff (subsidy) with an equal export 
subsidy (tax). There are three main reasons for using this trade policy instrument. 
Firstly, the use of an equal import tariff allows export subsidies to be used under 
integrated markets as they ensure there is no opportunity for arbitrageurs to make a 
profit by repeatedly exporting a good, collecting the export subsidy and then re- 
importing the good. Secondly, this trade policy instrument ensures that markets 
remain integrated rather than being artificially segmented, as would be the case if an 
import tariff was used alone. Thirdly, the trade policy instrument greatly simplifies 
the analysis of trade policy under integrated markets as it implies a single arbitrage 
condition which holds with equality, rather than the two inequalities which would be 
implied by the use of conventional trade policy. 
The trade policy instrument described above is introduced in Chapter 4, where 
it is used in a two-country strategic trade policy model under both complete and 
incomplete information. In Chapter, 5 the complete information model is extended to a 
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multi-country model, and the formation of trade blocs under integrated markets is 
analysed. 
This introductory chapter continues by considering alternative approaches to 
modelling the formation of trade blocs and explaining the approach taken in later 
chapters. The last section of this chapter contains an outline of the remainder of the 
thesis. 
1.2. Modelling trade bloc formation 
Given that one of the main aims of this thesis is to analyse the optimal size of 
trade blocs under various assumptions, it is important to consider how the formation 
of a trade bloc should be modelled. Chapters 2 and 5 look explicitly at models of bloc 
formation, while the model of trade blocs between asymmetric countries in Chapter 3 
also involves certain underlying assumptions about the behaviour of both members 
and non-members, even though there is no consideration of equilibrium trade bloc 
structures. The game theoretic literature on coalition formation is extensive, with 
many recent contributions both at a purely theoretical level and with particular 
applications in areas such as industrial organisation, public economics and 
international trade. The aim of this section is to identify certain key differences 
between approaches and consider how best to model trade bloc formation. The 
following issues need to be considered, and are discussed below. Should bloc 
formation be modelled as a cooperative or a non-cooperative game? What is the 
10 
process by which coalitions are formed? When is a coalition stable? After a coalition 
is formed, what happens to those who are excluded? And what assumptions are made 
. -bout the behaviour of these outsiders? 
Perhaps the most fundamental distinction between models of coalition 
fonnation is that between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches. Cooperative 
approaches are generally based on core theory, an example being Hart and Kurz's v 
(1983) paper, which models endogenous coalition formation as a cooperative game, 
using a coalition structure value developed by Owen (1977). It is assumed that players 
form coalitions to bargain over a fixed total pay-off, with only efficient outcomes 
considered. However, this does not seem to be a realistic approach to modelling trade 
blocs. In the global economy, countries and firms which belong to the same trade bloc 
still behave non-cooperatively in the markets where they compete and the assumption 
of efficient outcomes does not seem reasonable. While there are some mechanisms in 
place in the EU for redistributing income between countries, these are not really 
linked to the distribution of gains from trade. Rather than thinking of some total 
payoff to all members resulting from the formation of a trade bloc and explaining how 
it is divided between countries, it seems more realistic to consider the payoff to each 
country acting individually without the possibility of transfers between countries. An 
additional drawback of cooperative equilibrium concepts such as the core or the 
bargaining set is that they concentrate on the allocation of fixed payoffs. As Ray and 
Vohra (1997) note, this is only appropriate when the actions of players outside the 
coalition do not affect the payoffs of coalition members. This is not generally the case 
when looking at models of international trade. Hence a non-cooperative approach to 
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trade bloc formation is preferred, where firms and countries compete to maximise 
their own payoffs. 
When considering the process of coalition formation, some assumption needs 
to be made about the form which negotiations take. It is assumed in Chapters 2 and 5, 
following Bloch (1995,1996) and Yi (1996) that the process involves one player 
proposing a coalition consisting of a subset of the players, after which each potential 
member of the coalition can accept or reject the coalition. The coalition forms if and 
only if all potential members agree to it. This comes closer to matching the process by 
which trade blocs are actually formed than an alternative assumption of matching 
proposals (as in Hart and Kurz (1983)), under which every player proposes the 
coalition which it wishes to belong to and the coalition is formed if and only if all 
members make the same proposal. Another possible assumption would be that made 
by Bernheim et al. (1987) and Ray and Vohra (1997), that the negotiating process 
begins with the grand coalition, from which groups of players can leave to form 
separate coalitions. However, in a trade model, this is equivalent to assuming that the 
starting point for negotiations is global free trade, which does not seem to be a 
reasonable assumption when observing the real world. 
Another issue surrounding the formation of coalitions is whether or not any 
agreement is binding. Bernheim et al. (1987) introduced the concept of a coalition- 
proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE). A CPNE must be self-enforcing, meaning that each 
player's action must be a best response to other players' actions, and no coalition of 
players can profitably deviate. An alternative assumption is made by Ray and Vohra 
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(1997) in their model of equilibrium binding agreements. They assume that players 
joining a coalition sign a binding agreement, so the coalition does not need to be self- 
enforcing. Although it is arguable which of these two cases is more appropriate to the 
issue of trade bloc formation, the former is used and it is assumed that agreements 
must be self-enforcing. 
A related issue is that of stability of a coalition. Under the solution concepts 
considered by d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and Hart and Kurz (1983), a coalition 
structure is only stable if there is no incentive for any player or group of players to 
leave their coalition or join another. The 'internal stability' concept, that a coalition is 
not stable if one or more of the members do not want to belong to it, is essential for 
any model of trade bloc formation. Countries are not forced to join preferential trade 
agreements, but do so only if they perceive it to be in their interests. However, the 
(external stability' concept, that no player outside a coalition should wish to become a 
member, does not seem appropriate when considering trade blocs. Many countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe wish to join the EU, and similarly many countries in 
Central and South America wish to join NAFTA, but the existing members of these 
organisations are free to block entry. Hence the ability to block entry should be a 
feature of how trade bloc formation is modelled. This is a feature of a number of 
models of coalition formation, including Bernheim et al. (1987), Ray and Vohra 
(1997) and Bloch (1995). 
When considering the formation of a coalition, the assumption made about 
what happens to non-members is crucial. Two possible extreme assumptions were 
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introduced by Hart and Kurz (1983). Under their concept of 8-stability, all outsiders 
fonn a single coalition, whereas with 7-stability all outsiders remain as singletons. In 
the model of Bernheim et al. (1987), in which a new coalition can only be formed by 
a player or group of players leaving an existing coalition, it is assumed that other 
members of the coalition which breaks down can form any coalitions among 
themselves but all players outside that coalition remain in their original coalitions. 
Finally, Ray and Vohra (1997) assume that any (optimal) coalition structure is 
possible. The last of these four possible assumptions would seem to be the best, as it 
incorporates the others as special cases, and where possible it is used in Chapters 2 
and 5. However, given the difficulty of solving some of the models in this thesis, even 
when only allowing for two blocs, it is not always possible to use the most general 
assumption. For the case considered in Chapter 2 with segmented markets, Yi (1996), 
using a similar but more general model of trade bloc formation, has shown that with a 
11'k reasonable assumption about the number of countries in the world there will never be 
more than two blocs in equilibrium. 4 Hence assuming a maximum of two blocs in the 
world, as is done for some results in Chapter 2, is not unduly restrictive. Under 
integrated markets, as considered in Chapter 5, the model with constant costs can be 
solved more generally but the model with costs dependent on the size of the trade 
bloc is only solved for two blocs. The focus of Chapter 3 is somewhat different, 
looking at the effects of asymmetric countries forming or expanding trade blocs 
without trying to find an equilibrium structure. In that chapter it is generally assumed 
for simplicity that outsiders are all singletons; however, given the assumptions of the 
4 The relationship between Yi's model and the model presented in Chapter 2 is discussed in more detail 
in that chapter. 
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model, a sufficient assumption is that the structure of any trade blocs other than that 
being considered does not change. 
The final issue regarding the modelling of coalition formation mentioned 
, J, above is that of the assumption made concerning the actions of outsiders. The two 
obvious assumptions which could be made about their response to a trade bloc being 
fonned are firstly that their actions are unchanged (Bernheim et A (1987)) and 
secondly that they play best responses (Ray and Vohra (1997), Bloch (1995)). 
Throughout this thesis, the second of these assumptions is used. 
Taking into account the discussion above, the formation of trade blocs is 
modelled as a noncooperative sequential game, based on Bloch's (1995) model of 
endogenous formation of associations in oligopolies and Yi's (1996) model of 
endogenous trade bloc formation with unanimous regionalism. Bloch (1995) 
considers a Coumot oligopoly with homogeneous products, with associations formed 
to reduce costs but not to collude on the market. The unique equilibrium association 
structure consists of two asymmetric coalitions, the larger of which contains roughly 
three quarters of the finns in the industry. 
Finns are indexed i= 11 2,..., n. One firm i is selected as the initiator and 
proposes an association, A(i), consisting of a subset of the finns in the industry. All 
prospective members of association A(i) respond in turn, and the association is only 
formed if all these firms agree. In this case the remaining firm with the lowest index 
number is chosen as the new initiator. If a prospective member of AQ) rejects the 
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offer, it becomes the initiator in the new round. The game has an infinite horizon and 
firms do not discount payoffs. In the case of an infinite play of the gaine, all finns 
receive a payoff of zero. The process continues until an association structure emerges, 
which is a partition of all the firms in the industry into disjoint associations. 5 
The structure of Bloch's (1995) game, used by Yi (1996) when considering 
tunammous regionalism', allows existing members of an association to block entry by 
new members, so a structure is stable so long as no firm wishes to leave its association 
given that other associations can prevent it from entering. This approach seems 
suitable for the analysis of customs unions, as existing members can clearly prevent 
new members from entering. 
This game allows for the formation of asymmetric associations, and it is 
possible that in equilibrium countries in one trade bloc would rather become members 
of a different bloc. 6 This situation arises because of the ability of any member of a 
trade bloc to prevent the admission to the bloc of a country which it does not want to 
join. 
5 Bloch (1995) shows that with symmetric firms the equilibria in the game of association formation in 
an oligopolistic industry are the same as those in a game in which firms sequentially announce choices 
of association sizes. 
6 In Bloch's (1995) model, the fn-rns in the larger association earn higher profits, so all fitnis, would 
prefer to belong to this association. This presents the obvious problem of how membership of different 
associations is determined. In the industrial organisation setting of Bloch's paper, with firms identical 
ex ante, there is no clear way of determining which firms should belong to which association. In the 
case of trade blocs, geographical and political considerations will in reality play a major role in 
determining who belongs to which bloc. Hence the question of which countries belong to the preferred 
bloc, while theoretically undetermined, need not be a problem when applied to the real world. 
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1.3. Outline of the thesis 
There are four main chapters in this thesis, together with this introduction and 
a general conclusion. Chapter 2 presents two models of trade bloc formation under 
segmented markets, first where firms have common constant marginal costs and then 
with costs decreasing in the number of countries belonging to a bloc. The first model 
is similar to Yi's (1996) model of customs union formation with unanimous 
regionalism, except that products are assumed to be homogeneous. Unlike in Yi's 
paper, explicit solutions are found for the optimal number of countries in the customs 
unions formed in equilibrium, given the number of countries in the world. As in Yi's 
paper, it is found that a majority of countries join the first bloc to form; in fact, very 
few are excluded. An important addition to the results found by Yi concerns the 
stability of free trade when the world consists of small numbers of countries. When 
there are no more than four countries, global free trade is shown to always be 
preferred by all countries, whereas when there are five or more countries in the world 
there is always an incentive for a trade bloc which excludes at least one country to be 
established. 
The second model in Chapter 2 replaces the assumption of common marginal 
costs with marginal costs decreasing in the size of the trade bloc in which the firm is 
based. Hence, when the world is divided into two blocs, finns based in countries in 
the larger bloc have lower costs than finns located in the smaller bloc. While the cost 
reduction increases the welfare gains from trade bloc membership, it has little effect 
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on the results of the model. Tariff rates for a given size of bloc are similar to those 
when there is no cost reduction, and the size of the first bloc to forin is unaffected. 
Chapter 3 considers the formation of free trade areas and customs unions 
under segmented markets, in a world where countries differ in market size, as 
measured by a demand parameter. In all other ways, countries are identical to each 
other. It is shown that the fonnation or expansion of a free trade area will always lead 
to a reduction in members' tariffs and a rise in the joint welfare of both members and 
non-members. The smaller partner always gains, but usually the larger partner's 
welfare will decline. The effect of the formation of a two-country customs union on 
each country's tariff is generally ambiguous. A country's tariff is more likely to rise 
when (a) there are more countries to raise tariffs from; (b) the country is small; and 
(c) the country's partner is large. The welfare of the smaller country will always rise, 
while the effect on the larger country is ambiguous. Joint welfare of the member 
countries rises, but non-members' welfare falls. If customs union members form a 
single market, the optimal common external tariff and joint welfare will be the same 
as when markets remain segmented, but the large country is likely to be better off 
with the single market. 
The results in Chapter 3 suggest there is unlikely to be any incentive for 
fonning a free trade area unless transfers between partners are possible, while the 
result for customs unions is less plear. When a three-country model is considered, it is 
shown that while the formation of a two-country free trade area or customs union will 
raise the joint welfare of its members, in each case the larger member's welfare falls 
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in comparison to the Nash tariff equilibrium. Hence the smaller partner would need to 
compensate the larger partner to form a trade bloc. 
The fact that small countries gain from trade bloc membership while large 
countries often lose provides a rationale for the numerous concessions by small 
countries on non-trade issues which have recently been seen to accompany 
preferential trade agreements. For example, the side agreements on the environment 
and labour standards which Mexico signed when joining NAFTA can be viewed as a 
transfer from Mexico to the United States to induce the United States to sign a 
welfare-reducing trade agreement. 
Chapter 4, which is joint work with David R. Collie and Morten Hviid, 
presents a model of strategic trade policy under integrated markets and derives 
optimal trade policies under assumptions of both complete and incomplete 
information, using a trade policy instrument, described earlier in this introduction, 
which combines an export subsidy (tax) with an equal import tariff (subsidy). With 
the assumption of complete information it is shown that the optimal policy is an 
import tariff (export subsidy) when a country is a net importer (exporter). In the Nash 
equilibrium in trade policies the low cost country gives an export subsidy which is 
fully countervailed by the import tariff of the other country. The introduction of 
incomplete information about costs adds an incentive for both governments to use 
their trade policy as a signal of their finns' costs. This signalling effect increases the 
export subsidy and decreases the import tariff. In the simultaneous signalling game, 
with symmetry, the expected welfare in the separating equilibrium is higher than 
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under free trade for both countries. As well as contributing to the literature on trade 
policy under integrated markets, which is still rather limited, this chapter also 
provides the groundwork for the analysis of trade bloc formation under integrated 
markets in the following chapter. 
Chapter 5 considers models of trade bloc formation similar to those 
analysed in Chapter 2, except that now world markets are assumed to be integrated 
and the trade policy instrument introduced in Chapter 4 is again used. The first 
model assumes that each country contains a single firm with common, constant 
marginal cost. It is shown that, under the assumptions of the model, tariffs and 
welfare are independent of the size of trade blocs. Hence there is no incentive for 
trade bloc formation. The model is then adapted so that costs fall as membership of 
a trade bloc increases. It is shown that when the world is divided into two trade 
blocs, the trade blocs will set equal trade policies. Thus the large (relatively low 
cost) bloc will set an export subsidy which is fully countervailed by the import 
tariff set by the smaller bloc. It is also shown that the grand coalition, in which all 
finns belong to a single cost reducing trade bloc, is unstable for a large range of 
parameter values. In these cases there is an incentive for a group, containing less 
than half of the total countries in the world, not to join the grand coalition but 
rather to fonn a separate trade bloc. The result that a country would never want to 
be in the larger of two blocs is initially surprising and contrasts with results found 
under segmented markets, but can be explained by considering the effect of the 
trade policy instrument on govenunent revenue. Government revenue is positive 
for an importing bloc, which sets a positive import tariff, but negative for an 
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exporting bloc, which pays a subsidy on all exports. Thus the trade policy 
instrument used effectively penalises low cost, exporting blocs. It is further argued 
that where countries have an incentive to belong to a small trade bloc, the two bloc 
coalition structure is likely to prove unstable and a larger number of small blocs is 
likely to fonn. 
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Chapter 2. 
Trade Bloc Formation Under Segmented Markets 
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2.1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been growing interest in regional integration. Many 
developments, including the completion of the European Single Market under the 
'1992' programme, the formation of NAFTA and the recent enlargement of the EU, 
have suggested that regional trade arrangements are an increasingly important 
component of the global trading system. It also seems likely that the move towards 
regional trade blocs will continue, with many Eastem European countries applying to 
join the EU and a number of countries in Central and South America pursuing 
NAFTA membership. Although the successful completion of the Uruguay Round has 
strengthened the multilateral trading system and partially allayed fears that 
regionalism is becoming more important than multilateralism, trade blocs are still 
clearly of great importance in international trade. 
Much of the recent literature on trade blocs, as in other areas of international 
trade theory, has focused on the importance of imperfect competition, market 
structure and economies of scale. Krugman (1991) showed that, in a model with 
differentiated products and preference for variety, non-cooperative tariff setting could 
lead to global welfare being minimised with three customs unions, although Bond and 
Syropoulos (1996) and Sinclair and Vines (1994) suggest that this result is not robust 
to changes in the pattern of comparative advantage or the type of trade blocs 
(from 
customs unions to free trade areas) respectively. Other models considered 
by Sinclair 
7 Fratzscher (1996) observes that 94% of world trade is conducted between current or potential 
members of the EU, NAFTA and 
ASEAN. 
23 
and Vines (1994). and Collie (1997) have looked at policy setting by trade blocs in 
Oligopolistic industries. However5 all these papers assume that trade blocs are 
symmetric, and none pay any attention to the process by which blocs are formed. A 
few papers, most notably Yi (1996), have developed models of endogenous trade bloc 
fon-nation. This chapter extends the existing literature on endogenous trade bloc 
formation under segmented markets in two main ways. First, the incentives for 
excluding countries from a trade bloc are considered when the number of countries in 
the world is small, and second, a cost reducing effect of trade bloc membership is 
introduced. 
Sinclair and Vines (1994) consider a model of multi-country oligopoly based 
on the two-country models of Brander and Krugman (1983) and Brander and Spencer 
(1984). Finns located in different countries produce undifferentiated products and 
compete in quantities. In this case tariffs are used to shift profits, and it is shown that 
a trend to fewer, larger customs unions could well lead to lower levels of protection, 
and always will do so once the number of symmetric unions has fallen to a certain 
level. The main factor driving this result is that customs union enlargement reduces 
the number of 'foreign' firms with rents to shift. With free trade areas in this model, 
trade bloc enlargement will always reduce tariffs. 
Collie (1997) also considers trade blocs when firms compete as Cournot 
oligopolists, but in his model the trade policy instrument used is export subsidies 
rather than tariffs. The model is a multi-country extension of Brander and Spencer 
(1985). It is assumed that there is a single oligopolistic industry based in the 
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industrialised countries, all the output from which is exported to the developing rest 
of the world. The lack of trade between industrialised countries ensures that no trade 
diversion occurs and the model therefore concentrates on profit shifting. Countries 
and trade blocs are again assumed to be symmetric. As tariffs are not considered, the 
blocs could be either customs unions or free trade areas. 
Collie's (1997) model suggests that the promotion of regional integration, 
leading to fewer, larger trade blocs, is desirable as, for any country, welfare for any 
country is an increasing function of the number of countries in its trade bloc. 
However, there is never an incentive for any individual country to join a trade bloc as 
increasing the number of countries in a bloc reduces the effectiveness of its strategic 
export subsidies. For instance, in a simple case with three countries, if two of the 
countries form a trade bloc they are made worse off, while the outsider is made better 
off. Thus there is a clear prisoners' dilemma: the formation of trade blocs raises 
welfare, but there is no incentive for individual countries to join them. 
The literature dealing with trade bloc formation is relatively small. Riezman 
(1985) uses core theory to analyse customs union formation in a three country model. 
Kowalczyk and Sj6str6m (1994) also use core theory to analyse the relationship 
between customs union formation and moves towards multilateral free trade. The 
approach used in this chapter is much more similar to that of yi, s (1996) model of 
endogenous formation of customs unions. Symmetric countries produce goods, at a 
common, constant marginal cost, which are imperfect substitutes for each other. 
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Fin-ns compete as Cournot oligopolists in segmented markets. Customs unions set 
their optimal common external tariffs to maximise the aggregate welfare of members. 
Yi (1996) derives the following results about the welfare effects of bloc 
expansion on both members and non-members. The expansion of a bloc, or the 
merger of two or more blocs, makes outsiders worse off due to a fall in their export 
profits. The joint welfare of bloc members rises when a bloc expands or blocs merge, 
but not all members necessarily gain. Specifically, it is shown that existing bloc 
members might be made worse off by an expansion, or members of a relatively large 
bloc might lose from a merger. The effect of an expansion or merger on global 
welfare is ambiguous, although global free trade maximises world welfare. In any 
customs union structure, each member of a larger bloc is better off than each member 
of a smaller bloc. 
Two possible rules of bloc formation are considered: open regionalism and 
unanimous regionalism. Under open regionalism, any country which wants to join a 
bloc is free to do so, so long as it abides by the rules followed by other bloc members. 
Under unanimous regionalism, all existing bloc members must agree before a new 
member can be admitted. Open regionalism is considered as both a simultaneous 
move game and a sequential move game. When all countries move simultaneously, 
the unique Nash equilibrium is global free trade, which is also a subgame perfect 
equilibrium (SPE) in the sequential move game. However, in the latter case this is 
typically not a unique SPE. A symmetric customs union structure with more than one 
bloc can never be stable, but there might be SPE asymmetric coalition structures. 
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With unanimous regionalism, there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium association 
structure. There can be no more than three customs unions, and for a reasonable 
number of countries no more than two. 8 If the number of countries in the world is 
small and the degree of product differentiation high, free trade might be optimal. This 
situation arises when the gains from free trade outweigh the potential gains from rent 
shifting. 
The assumption of unanimous regionalism seems more appropriate for 
analysing trade bloc formation than that of open regionalism. Under the latter 
assumption, any country must be free to join any trade bloc which is formed. 
However, in reality this is not true. A number of countries wish to join either the EU 
or NAFTA, but are unable to do so without the approval of the existing members of 
these blocs. Hence Yi's assumption of unanimous regionalism seems much more 
realistic. The assumption of unanimous regionalism can be thought of as 
encompassing a notion of internal stability, but without any need for external 
stability. Internal stability implies that no country within a trade bloc wishes to leave 
the bloc, or equivalently no country can be forced to join a trade bloc if it would 
prefer to remain outside. However, with no requirement for external stability, it is 
possible that countries outside a trade bloc would gain from joining the bloc, were 
they allowed to do so. This would seem to be consistent with real world observations 
of how customs unions and free trade areas are formed and restrict their membership. 
8 For any possibility of three customs unions being an equilibrium, the world must consist of more than 
262,144 countries. 
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The model in Section 2.2 is similar to Yi's (1996) model with unanimous 
regionalism, except that products are assumed to be homogeneous. Unlike in Yi's 
paper, solutions are found for the optimal number of countries in the customs unions 
formed in equilibrium, given the number of countries in the world. As in Yi (1996), it 
is found that a majority of countries join the first bloc to form; in fact, very few are 
excluded. The most important addition to Yi's results in this section is the 
consideration of the incentives for a customs union or free trade area, which excludes 
at least one country, to form when the number of countries in the world is small, in 
preference to global free trade. It is shown that with no more than four countries, 
global free trade is always optimal, whereas with five or more countries, there is 
always an incentive for a trade bloc to fonn, excluding (at least) one country. 
A potentially important effect of regional integration, which has generally 
been neglected in previous work, is the potential for a fall in the costs faced by firms 
located in countries belonging to a trade bloc. A further aim of this chapter is to 
examine the consequences of this, and hence Section 2.3 changes the assumption 
made about firms' costs. The assumption of common marginal costs is replaced by 
marginal costs decreasing in the size of the trade bloc in which the firm is based. 
Hence, when the world is divided into two blocs, finns based in countries in the larger 
bloc have lower costs than firms located in the smaller bloc. There are a number of 
reasons why this might be true, including the hannonisation of standards 
accompanying some regional trade agreements and an increase in research joint 
ventures, but perhaps the most important effect, given the partial equilibrium nature 
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of the model, is a likely fall in the cost of inputs arising from the abolition of tariffs 
between partners. 
The assumption of costs decreasing in the number of countries belonging to a 
trade bloc actually has little effect on the results of the model. The optimal tariff rate 
set by a bloc of any size falls slightly when the cost reducing effect is introduced, and 
the welfare of a member of a bloc of any size increases. However, there is no 
significant effect on the equilibrium structure of trade blocs. 
The rest of this Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model of 
trade bloc formation under segmented markets with common, constant costs. Section 
2.3 suggests reasons why trade bloc membership might lead to a reduction in a firm's 
costs, and introduces a cost function which includes this effect into the model. 
Finally, Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2. Model with constant costs 
This section and Section 2.3 develop models of trade bloc formation under 
segmented markets, first with common constant costs and then with costs decreasing 
in the number of countries belonging to a trade bloc. The formation of trade blocs is 
modelled as a noncooperative sequential game, based on Bloch's (1995) model of 
endogenous formation of associations in oligopolies and Yi's (1996) model of 
endogenous trade bloc formation with unanimous regionalism. Countries are indexed 
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i=1,2,..., n. One country i is selected as the initiator and proposes an association, 
consisting of a subset of the countries in the world. 9 All prospective members of 
association A(i) respond in turn, and the association is only formed if all these 
countries agree. In this case the country outside the association with the lowest index 
number is chosen as the new initiator. If a prospective member of A(i) rejects the 
offer, it becomes the initiator in the new round. The game has an infinite horizon and 
countries do not discount payoffs. In the case of an infinite play of the game, all 
countries receive a payoff of zero. The process continues until an association structure 
emerges, which is a partition of all the countries in the world into disjoint 
associations. 
This game allows for the formation of asymmetric associations, and it is 
possible that in equilibrium, countries in one trade bloc would rather become 
members of a different bloc, if entry into that other bloc were allowed. 10 This 
situation arises because of the ability of any member of a trade bloc to prevent the 
admission to the bloc of a country which it does not want to join. " 
Formally, the model can be described as follows. First, the multi-stage game 
outlined above allows countries to form trade blocs. Subsequently, trade blocs set 
tariffs to maximise members' welfare. Finally, firms compete in quantities in 
segmented national markets. Although attention is later restricted to the case where a 
9 Given the symmetry between countries, it could be assumed without loss of generality that country I 
is always selected. 
10 In Bloch's (1995) model, the firms in the larger coalition earn higher profits, so all firms would 
prefer to belong to this coalition. 
11 Given the assumption of symmetry between countries, either all countries in a bloc will want another 
country to join or all will want to 
block entry. 
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maximum of two trade blocs can form, the model is first set out more generally to 
allow for any number of trade blocs and results on optimal tariffs are derived in this 
general setting. 
The world consists of n symmetric countries, i=1, ..., n, each of which 
contains one firm producing a homogeneous product with common, constant marginal 
costs. It is assumed that there are no transport costs. The countries form customs 
unions or free trade areas (associations). The notation used in referring to associations 
follows Bloch (1995). The association to which country i belongs is denoted by A(i), 
with the country identified by the contents of the brackets. Each individual trade bloc 
is identified by a subscript, which refers to the order in which the blocs are formed in 
the game described above. Thus the associations are indexed r=1, ..., R, with 
association A, the first to form and association AR the last to fonn. The number of 
countries belonging to association r is denoted by ar. Hence the association structure 
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(2.1) 
All members of association r set the same tariff rate, 'Em on imports from all non- 
members. This can be seen as the MFN tariff, as required by GATT rules 
12 
. Trade 
between partner countries is not subject to tariffs. 
12 The MFN principle, stated in Article I of GATT, requires that each country grants all its trading 
partners the most favourable treatment it grants any country. One of the exceptions to this, under 
Article XXIV, is for the case of preferential trade agreements with zero tariffs on trade between 
partners. 
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As usual, in analysing this game the final stage is considered first. Firms are 
assumed to set quantities and each firm has a common constant marginal cost c. 
Demand in country i is given by the linear demand function yj =a- Ppi, where yj and 
pi are total demand and price in country i. Markets are segmented, so each firm makes 
separate decisions about how much to supply to each market. Price in country i is 
given by the inverse demand function: 
ot 
Yi (2.2) 
Total consumption and total production in country i are given by, respectively, 
Yi xji (2.3) 
and 
xi (2.4) 
where xy (xji) is the amount SuPPlied by the firm in country i (j) to the country j (i) 
market. 
The profits earned by the finn based in country i are given by 
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-c- Tji) xu 
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(2.5) 
where -rji is the tariff imposed by countryj on imports from country i. Using the fact 
that -rji =0 ifj E=- A(i) and rji = -rj ifj o A(i), where -rj is the tariff set by each member 
of bloc A(i), (2.5) can be rewritten as: 
7C i -. '::: 
I (pj 
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(2.6) 
where the first tenn on the right hand side represents profits in countries which belong 
to the same trade bloc as country i, and the second term represents profits in non- 
member countries. Using symmetry between members of a given trade bloc, (2.6) can 
be rewritten as 
7c i= ai (pi - c)xii l(pj - C- "j) Xy jOA(i) 
(2.7) 
It should be noted that, given the assumptions of segmented markets and constant 
marginal costs, maximising the above expression for total profits is equivalent to 
maximising profits in each market individually. 
Now consider the market in country i, which is a member of bloc A(i). Note 
that, given the assumption of MFN tariffs, all firms located in blocs A(j) # A(i) are 
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treated symmetrically. From (2.7), the first order conditions for maximising profits 
earned in country i by firms located inside and outside bloc A(i), respectively, will be: 
0 91n '= ai (pi - c) + ai -ýP-' xi, 0 (2.8) axii axii 
and 
Cýnj 
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(2.9) 
Using (2.8) and (2.9), and noting that apilaxii = apilaxji = -1/0, the following 
expressions can be obtained for the output produced by each firm for the market in 
country i: 
oc 
-1x ki - 
PC 
(2.10) 
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In total, there are ai 'home' firms selling xii in country i and (n - aj) foreign 
finns selling xji. Equations (2.10) and (2.11) can be used to find the following pair of 
simultaneous equations for the two output levels: 
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xii = cc - (n - ai ) xji - Pc 
(n - ai + 1)xji =a- aixii - Pc - Pri 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
Solving these equations gives the following expressions for each firm's sales in 
country i: 
ot - PC +n- ai ,, i (2.14) n+1n+I 
Xii - 
cc - Pc ai +I PTj (2.15) 
n+In+1 
Total consumption in country i is yj = aixii + (n - ai)xji, and substituting (2.14) and 
(2.15) into this expression gives 
Yi = 
n+n+ 
Price in country i can be found using the inverse demand function (2.2), giving 
(2.16) 
35 
(X n n-a. Pi _z(n+1)ý+n+lc+ 
n+I' 
r' (2.17) 
Welfare in country i is defined as the sum of domestic consumer surplus, 
profits earned by the domestic firm in both its own bloc and all other blocs and tariff 
revenue on imports from non-partner countries. Thus welfare is: 
Wi =ly2+ ai(pi - c)xii + 
(n 
- ai)(pj -c-T+ 
(n 
- ai) Tixji 2p i j) Xu 
To find the optimal tariff for country i as a function of the number of countries in its 
bloc, aj, Wi must be differentiated with respect to ri. The expression found below does 
not depend on the structure of other blocs, or the tariffs which they set. Hence the 
optimal tariff for bloc A(i) is independent of what happens outside this bloc. This is 
unsurprising given the usual strategic independence between countries when 
analysing trade policy with Cournot competition and constant marginal costs under 
segmented markets. 
aw I ayi axii api axji 
,I= 
-Yi +ai(pi -c) + ai xii + 
(n - ai) xji + 
(n 
- ai)-c i (2.19) oli p CtTi aTi 03t i ati 
Using equations (2-14) to (2.17), equation (2.19) can be rewritten as: 
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(n +1 (n + 1) 
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To find the optimal tariff for a country in bloc i, equation (2-20) must be set equal to 
zero. Hence we find the optimal tariff to be: 
2a, +1 oc - PC 
2a 2 +3a +n+2 P ii 
(2.21) 
Having found this optimal tariff, the effects of changing the values of n and ai 
can be analysed. It is clear that an increase in n, the number of countries in the world, 
will reduce any bloc's external tariff, given that the number of countries belonging to 
that bloc remains unchanged. A more interesting issue is that of the effect of an 
increase in aj, the size of the bloc being considered. Differentiating (2.21) with respect 
to ai gives 
-4a 
2 
-4a +2n+l a-pc 




For a given value of n, this equation allows the effects of an increase in ai to be 
considered. For n ý! 4. the derivative above is positive for ai small but ai -2! 1, but 
quickly becomes negative as ai increases. Thus there might initially be an increase in 
the optimal tariff for a small trade bloc as its size increases, but after reaching a 
certain size a subsequent expansion will always result in lower tariffs being set. The 
initial rise in tariffs is the result of an increase in market power as small countries set 
their tariffs cooperatively. However, an increase in membership of the trade bloc not 
37 
only increases members' market power, but also tends to reduce the effectiveness of 
tariffs as a profit-shifting device due to the reduction in the number of outside firms to 
shift profits from. As the size of a trade bloc rises, the second effect quickly starts to 
dominate, explaining why optimal tariffs fall. For instance, with n= 100 the tariff set 
by a bloc increases as membership rises until ai = 7, after which any subsequent 
expansion will reduce the level of the optimal tariff. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, 
which shows the common external tariff each customs union will set as a function of 
the number of members. 13 It is assumed here, without loss of generality, that each 
firm's marginal cost c is equal to one and the parameters of demand (x and P equal 
100 and one respectively, while n is set equal to 100. 
Next the incentive to form a trade bloc which excludes one country, as 
opposed to choosing global free trade, is considered. To do this, welfare under free 
trade is compared to welfare of a bloc which contains n-I members while excluding 
the final country. Using equations (2.14) to (2.17) and (2.21) in (2.18), the 
expressions for welfare given below can be derived. The notation Wi(y; 8) refers to the 
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Figure 2.1. Tariffs set by blocs of size ai and (n - aj), n= 100 






Figure 2.2. Welfare of members of blocs of size ai and (n - aj), n= 100 
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(2.24) 
Using the two equations above, it is possible to arrive at the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.1. Under segmented markets with constant costs, globalfree trade is 
optimal when there are no more than four countries. When the world consists of at 
leastfive countries, thefirst customs union toform will exclude at least one country. 
Proot From equations (2.23) and (2.24), the following condition can be obtained for 
welfare in a bloc which excludes one country to exceed welfare under global free 
trade: 
Wi (n - 1; 1) > Wi (n; O) <:::, AM 4n 4 +4n'-51n 2- 206n - 47 >0 
This condition clearly holds for large values of n, whereas for very small values of n 
it does not hold. The critical value of n above which the condition will hold lies 
between 4 and 5, as is illustrated by considering the values of A at n=4 and n=5: 
4 => A= -407 
5 => A= 648 
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Together with the fact that dAldn = 16n + 12n - 102n - 206 >0 for n ý! 3, this is 
sufficient to show that A will always be positive for n ý! 5. Hence global free trade is 
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optimal with n :! ý, 4, while with n -2: 5 there is an incentive for a trade bloc to form 
which excludes at least one country. 0 
Using equations (2.23) and (2.24), the actual values of welfare for country i 
under global free trade and in a trade bloc containing n-I countries can be found for 
n=4 and n=5. allowing the differences in welfare to be calculated explicitly: 


















Wi (5; 0) - Wi (4; 1) = 
-451 
(oc - PC)' 
10116 P 












Hence Wi(4; 0) > Wi(3; 1) and Wi(5; 0) < Wi(4; 1), confinning the result found above. 
The result that ftee trade is stable when there are no more than four countries 
in the world, but excluding at least one country is optimal when there are five or more 
countries, is similar to results found in the industrial organisation literature dealing 
with cartel formation. Selten (1973) considers a three stage cartel formation game, in 
which finns first decide whether to participate in cartel negotiations, then potential 
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cartel members submit proposals for quotas for each member and finally firms set 
outputs subject to any quotas. It is shown that a cartel containing all finns in an 
industry is stable when there are no more than four firms. Hviid (1992) presents a 
model in which firms first decide whether to join a cartel, then if a cartel forms it sets 
its output before any outsiders make their output decisions. Again, under full 
information, a cartel containing all firms in the industry will only be an equilibrium 
when there are no more than four firms. 
To understand why a trade bloc which excludes some countries might be 
optimal for its members, it is useful to consider the effects on various components of 
countries' welfare resulting from a move from global free trade to the case where n -1 
countries belong to a trade bloc, while one country is excluded. The firm in the 
excluded country now faces positive tariffs in all its export markets, reducing the 
profits it earns in those n-I countries, which outweighs the firin's gains in its own 
country's protected market. However, the firms in the large bloc now earn higher 
profits in each others' markets and lower profits in the single excluded country. 
Consumer surplus falls everywhere, but this effect is greater in the excluded country, 
where n-1 firms face tariffs and the equilibrium price rises by more, than in the large 
bloc with a single finn affected by tariffs. Meanwhile, all countries now have positive 
tariff revenue. 
Generally, it can be seen that the effects described above result in larger gains and 
smaller losses for the n-I countries in the large trade bloc than for the single 
excluded country. Hence, as has already been seen, there are usually gains to be made 
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ftom forming a trade bloc which excludes at least one country. Table 2.1 below 
emphasises these results, showing that in each case with n ý! 5, the members of the 
larger trade bloc gain over free trade and the members of the smaller bloc lose. 14 
Overall global welfare is reduced by the world splitting into two blocs in each case, as 
can be seen by the last two columns of the table which give the mean welfare of a 
country in the case with two blocs (W,,,, ) and the welfare of a representative country 
under global free trade (Wft), respectively. 
Finally in this section, the optimal number of countries belonging to the first 
bloc to form is considered. It is assumed that the world is divided into no more than 
two blocs, which is not a restrictive assumption as Yi (1996), in a similar model 
which also allows for the possibilitý of product differentiation, shows that no more 
n a, a2 T, T2 W, W2 Wave Wft 
4 4 0 - - 4684.5 - 4684.5 4684.5 
5 4 1 17.471 24.75 4776.4 4098.8 4640.9 4764.4 
20 18 2 5.0594 13.75 4902.1 4628.6 4874.7 4889.4 
50 47 3 2.0397 8.7721 4903.1 4776.5 4895.5 4898.6 












Table 2.1: Some numerical examples with common, constant marginal costs 
14 For the numerical results in Table 2.1, the following parameter values are assumed: u. = 100, p= 1, c 
1. 'fhe results are not significantly different for other parameter values which ensure positive outputs 
for all firms in all markets. 
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than two trade blocs will ever form if the number of countries in the world does not 
exceed 262,144. Hence if attention is restricted to cases with a reasonable number of 
countries (the numerical simulations in this chapter only consider values of n up to 
100), the assumption of no more than two blocs is unlikely to affect the results. 
Given the expressions for outputs, demand, prices and optimal tariffs which 
have already been derived, the final stage in finding the optimal number of firms in 
the first bloc involves differentiating country i's welfare Wi with respect to aj, and 
setting the resulting expression equal to zero. It is not possible to find a general 
algebraic solution to the resulting equation, which is a seventh order polynomial, but 
it is possible to find solutions for ai corresponding to any value of n. 15 Of the seven 
roots, only one is real and lies in the range 0 :! ý ai :! ý n. Thus for any number of 
countries in the world, there is only one feasible equilibrium for the number of 
countries in the first bloc. 16 Figure 2.3 shows the optimal value of ai for 1 :! ý n :!! ý 100, 
while Figure 2.4 shows the proportion of countries which are in the first bloc to form 
(ailn) for the same range of n. From these two figures, it can be seen that the first bloc 
to form will include most of the countries in the world, but will exclude some 
countries. If the integer constraint on ai is ignored, the first bloc will always contain 
over 90 per cent of the countries in the world. This is consistent with the result found 
by Yi (1996), that the first bloc to form will always contain a majority of the countries 
in the world. 
15 This equation is given in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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Figure 2.4. The proportion of countries in the first bloc to form 
45 
For any value of n, it is possible to calculate the number of countries in each 
of the two blocs. Some examples for different values of n, together with tariffs and 
welfare for members of the two blocs, are shown in Table 2.1. Constraining ai to be 
an integer, it is found that with n= 20, the blocs have 18 and two members 
respectively; with n= 50, they have 47 and three members; and with n= 100, they 
have 96 and four members. As is shown in Figure 2.4, once n exceeds five the 
proportion of countries in the larger bloc rises with n. Constraining ai to be an integer 
is particularly important to the results for small values of n, when the first customs 
union to forin would, in the absence of this integer constraint, like to exclude less than 
one country. 
The intuition behind the asymmetric bloc structure is as follows. An increase 
in the number of countries in a bloc has a number of effects. Firstly, each firm within 
the bloc has a larger tariff-free 'home' market, allowing a larger volume of exports to 
its partners in the bloc. Secondly, there are more firms selling in the domestic market 
of any bloc member. This tends to lower the price faced by domestic consumers, 
hence increasing consumer surplus, but the increased competition has a negative 
effect on the domestic firm's profits. Finally, there are less countries outside the bloc, 
meaning that any bloc member has less countries whose imports yield tariff revenues. 
Thus the overall effect of an increase in the number of countries in a bloc on welfare 
is ambiguous. However, the equilibrium customs union structure makes it clear that 
the first two, positive, effects on welfare dominate as membership increases until 
almost all the countries are included in a bloc, when the last two, negative, effects 
become more important. 
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2.3. Model with decreasing costs 
This section adapts the model in Section 2.2 by changing the assumption 
made about firms' cost functions. Specifically, it is now assumed that the marginal 
cost of the firm in country i is decreasing in the number of countries which are 
members of A(i), the trade bloc to which country i belongs. There are a number of 
justifications for this assumption. Perhaps the most important is that, given the partial 
equilibrium nature of the model, the effect of trade bloc formation on inputs into the 
production of the good needs to be taken into account. As more countries join a trade 
bloc, more inputs can be bought tariff-free from suppliers in partner countries and this 
is likely to cause a direct reduction in a firm's marginal cost. A second argument for 
the assumption of decreasing costs is that closer economic integration could lead to a 
number of measures which could cause a significant reduction in the costs of any firm 
supplying a number of different markets. 17 For example, the European '1992' 
programme included measures to reduce costs incurred in crossing national borders 
and also measures to harmonise standards across member states, thus reducing 
production costs. Finally, an indirect effect of closer economic integration could be an 
increase in cooperation between firms, for instance in forming joint research 
ventures. 18 This last justification for a reduction in costs resulting from increased 
membership of a trade bloc is similar to that considered by Bloch (1995) in his 
analysis of endogenous association fonnation in oligopolistic industries. 
17 However, some of the cost reduction could be related to fixed costs, assumed to be zero in this 
model, rather than marginal costs. 
18 It is assumed that while firms might cooperate in research, no collusion is possible in the market. 
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The specific functional form chosen for the marginal cost of firm i belonging 
to association A(i) of size ai is: 
ci (2.25) 
Thus it can be seen that ci is decreasing in aj, but the additional effect of each 
subsequent member joining a trade bloc is declining. This functional form is preferred 
to that used by Bloch (1995), ci =k- ýtaj, because of the diminishing effect that each 
additional bloc member has on the cost reduction. This seems more reasonable than a 
constant effect for the following reasons. Firstly, the more countries that belong to a 
trade bloc, the more likely it is that the lowest cost supplier of any input is already 
located within the bloc, thus reducing the potential gains from reducing the price of 
inputs when additional countries join. Secondly, the gains from harmonising 
standards (most likely derived from the possibility of longer production runs and 
consequent economies of scale) are likely to be less significant as membership of a 
customs union continues to rise. Finally, there are also likely to be diminishing 
returns to the number of countries participating in joint research ventures. 
in this section it is assumed from the start that only two trade blocs may form; 
that is, if bloc A, forms with a, members, all the other (n - a, ) countries In the world 
are members of bloc A2. A more general framework would be far more complicated to 
set up than in the previous section, as each firm's marginal cost depends on the 
number of partners belonging to its trade bloc. Restricting attention to two blocs from 
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the start means that every firm's marginal cost is known. Profits for the firm in 
country i are given by: 
iTi =ai(pi -ci)xii +(n-ai)(pj -ci -Tj)xj (2.26) 
Hence the first order conditions for the maximisation of profits by the firm in country 
i are 
0 ýn ' =ai pi-k- +ai 
ap'xii 
=0 (2.27) axii ai axii 
and 
0 ýn 





axii ai clxy 
Using (2.27) and (2.28) and noting that apilc9xii = t9pJclx.. = -1/p, the following i Ii 
expressions can be found for the output of a firm located in each bloc for each market: 
xii 
oc-pk_ n-2a, +ý),,, +n-aj,,, j 
(2.29) 
n+l a, (n + 1) n+1 
X12 a-pk_ n-2a, P, n-a, +1 Pr2 (2.30) 
n+1a, (n +n+1 
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a-P, % n-2a, -1 X21 -+ JL (2.31) 
n+I (n + 1)(n - a7l)) n+1 
X22 - (X - Pk + n-2a, -1 - Pýt + 
a, PC 
2 (2.32) 
n+I (n + 1)(n - a, ) n+I 
Total consumption in country i is yj = aýxjj + (n - ai)xji, and substituting equations 
(2.29) to (2.32) into this expression gives: 
Yi _ 
n(cc - Pý) - 2pýt - 
(n 
- ai ) Pc i 
n+1 
(2.33) 
Price in country i can be found by substituting (2.33) into the demand equation (2.2): 
(n + 
nk + 2ýt + 
(n 
- al), ri 
n+1n+I 
(2.34) 
Welfare in country i is defined, as in Section 2.2, as the sum of consumer 
surplus, profits earned by the domestic firm and tariff revenue and as before the 
optimal tariffs set by the two blocs are found by differentiating the welfare of a 
representative country in each bloc with respect to that bloc's tariff. Hence the tariffs 
set by the two blocs will be: 
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- aj + 1]((x - P. X, ) 
2 [2(n 
-a 1)2 +4n-3a, +2] 





+ 4n - 3a, + 2] 
(2.35) 
(2.36) 
The tariff rates found above can be substituted back into the countries' welfare 
functions. Differentiating the welfare of a member of bloc I with respect to the size of 
that bloc then allows us to determine the optimal size of the first bloc to form. 
Unfortunately, as was the case for the model with constant costs, a general algebraic 
solution cannot be found. ' 9 As in Section 2.2, the results presented here are obtained 
by numerical methods. The results presented here concentrate on a world consisting 
of 100 countries, with the values of cc and P set at 100 and 1 respectively, while 
different values of k and ýt are considered. 20 In all cases the sum of k and ýt is equal to 
one. Hence the results can be interpreted as being for the case where each firm has a 
marginal cost of one when the country it is located in does not belong to any trade 
bloc, while a higher value of ýt relative to k implies that trade bloc membership has a 
stronger effect in reducing firms' costs. 
Figure 2.5 shows optimal tariff rates set by a trade bloc with ai members in 
three cases: (a) k=1, ýt = 0; (b) k=0.8, ýt = 0.2; and (c) k=0.5, ýt = 0.5. These cases 
" The equation which needs to be solved is reproduced in the Appendix. 
20 The parameter values are chosen to ensure that all firms set positive outputs in all markets. Other 
parameter values which satisfy this condition yield similar results. 
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Figure 2.6. Welfare of a member of a bloc of size aj, n= 100 
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range from membership of a trade bloc having no effect to membership of a large 
trade bloc reducing a firm's costs by almost half In the two cases where there is a 
cost reduction, the tariffs with no cost reduction are also shown for comparison. It can 
be seen that there is very little difference between the tariffs set in these three cases. 21 
In each case increasing membership of a bloc leads to a rise in tariffs until ai = 7, then 
a fall as the size of the bloc rises further. Tariffs are slightly lower for higher values of 
[t relative to k, as would be expected as in general a country's optimal tariff is lower 
when the marginal cost of imports is lower. 22 Figure 2.6 shows, for the same 
parameter values, the welfare attained by a member of a trade bloc of any given size. 
Again the case with no cost reduction can be compared to the other two cases. The 
lower lines in Figures 2.6 (b) and (c) correspond to the line showing welfare in Figure 
2.6 (a), so welfare is higher for a bloc of any size when the cost reducing effect is 
introduced. In each case, welfare is maximised when the trade bloc contains 96 
members. 23 Thus, while the welfare of a member of a bloc of any size is increased by 
the cost reducing effect of bloc membership, the optimal size of the first bloc to form 
is unaffected. 
Table 2.2 gives equilibrium trade bloc sizes and welfare for members of each 
bloc for various values of n, for the case where k= ýt = 0.5. In other words, this is the 
21 Although it cannot be seen clearly from Figure 2.5, in the two cases with the cost reduction the 
tariffs lie slightly below those without the cost reduction. 
22 For lower values of cc, holding other parameter values constant, the effect of the cost reduction on 
tariffs is more pronounced, and numerical simulations suggest that a very small bloc's optimal trade 
policy might actually be to subsidise imports from a large, low cost bloc. However, the parameter 
values which produce this effect are not consistent with all firms setting positive outputs in this model. 
In particular, the parameter values imply that firms located in the small bloc would sell negative 
quantities in the large bloc. For this reason, this case is not analysed in detail. 
23 if the integer constraint is ignored, there are only very slight differences in the value of ai which 
maximises welfare, ranging from approximately 96.13 to 
96.16. 
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case where membership of a large trade bloc can reduce a firm's marginal cost by 
almost half of its original level. Comparing this table to Table 2.1, it can immediately 
be seen that for the values of n considered, the cost reducing effect of trade bloc 
formation has no impact on the optimal size of the first bloc to form. Free trade will 
still be achieved for values of n less than or equal to four, above which value a large 
bloc will gain by excluding at least one country. Any trade bloc containing more than 
one country will set lower tariffs in this case, due to the reduction in member firms' 
marginal costs. The cost function used in this section results in an increase in welfare 
for each country, compared to the case with common constant costs, for any value of 
n. However it is still true that members of the larger bloc gain and members of the 
smaller bloc lose relative to free trade, while the mean welfare of countries is lower in 
the equilibrium with two blocs than under global free trade. It can also be seen that, 
compared to the previous case, the welfare gain for the first bloc to form is greater 
than the welfare gain for the second bloc. This is as a result of the fact that the first, 
n a, a2 T, T2 
W, W2 Wave Wft 
4 4 0 - - 4740.2 - 4740.2 4740.2 
5 4 1 17.382 24.75 4813.5 4108.7 4672.5 4802.9 
20 18 2 4.9838 13.618 4949.5 4662.8 4920.8 4936.4 
50 47 3 1.9766 8.5548 4951.9 4818.1. 4943.9 4947.2 











I- - -1 
Table 2.2: Some numerical examples with ), f: _kt -=QO. 
5 
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larger bloc benefits more from the cost reducing effect of bloc membership and 
hence firms in that bloc gain a competitive advantage over other firms. 
The results given in Table 2.2, together with the more detailed analysis above 
of the case with n= 100, lead to the conclusion that the cost function used in this 
section has little effect on the results of the model, relative to the model with 
common, constant marginal costs in Section 2.2. Although the welfare of all countries 
increases when trade bloc membership reduces the marginal costs of firms located 
within the bloc, there is no change in the equilibrium bloc structure and the 
comparative welfare results are unaffected. This should not be surprising, at least for 
relatively high values of n. The cost function used in this section implies that most of 
the effect from trade bloc membership on firms' marginal costs comes from the first 
few partner countries, while each subsequent partner has a diminishing effect on 
costs. Hence when n and a, are large, the cost reducing effect of an additional 
member of the large trade bloc is very small. However it is still noteworthy that the 
results do not change for small values of n. Global free trade remains optimal when 
there are no more than four countries, but the presence of a fifth country leads to an 




This chapter has presented two models of trade bloc formation under 
segmented markets. In the first model, with all firms having common, constant 
marginal costs, it is found that a majority of countries join the first bloc to form; in 
fact, very few are excluded. When the world consists of no more than four countries, 
global free trade is optimal, while at least one country will be excluded when there are 
five or more countries in the world. 
The second model introduced the assumption that a firm's marginal cost is 
decreasing in the number of countries belonging to the trade bloc in which it is 
located. This assumption has little effect on the results of the model. The optimal 
tariff rate set by a bloc of any size falls slightly when the cost reducing effect is 
introduced, and the welfare of a member of a bloc of any size increases. However, 
there is little or no effect on the equilibrium structure of trade blocs. 
The results in this chapter suggest that where trade bloc membership reduces 
the costs of firms located in member countries, the main effect will be to increase the 
welfare of all countries. VAiile there is no effect on the equilibrium trade bloc 
structure, every country gains regardless of whether it is in the large bloc, which now 
has a cost advantage, or the small bloc, with relatively high marginal costs. Of course 
the global gains from trade bloc membership are largest when there is a single, global 
trade bloc. Hence the gains from trade bloc membership do not alter the conclusion 
that free trade is optimal, provided the cost reducing effect of trade bloc membership 
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passes on to the case of global free trade. This is not automatic, as it is arguable that 
gains from harmonisation of standards or research joint ventures are more likely to 
arise when a subset of countries cooperates in a regional trade agreement. If these 
gains are not available through global free trade, then comparison of the results in 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows that for values of n of 20,50 and 100, the average welfare 
of any country when the world divides into two cost-reducing trade blocs is higher 
than each country's welfare under free trade when costs remain constant. However, 
members of the smaller trade bloc are better off in the latter case than in the former. 
One possible reason why the reduction in costs does not alter the equilibrium 
trade bloc structure is the specific cost function used, which results in a decreasing 
effect of each additional bloc member. This means there is very little additional 
incentive for an already large bloc to accept another member. An alternative case to 
consider would be one in which each additional member has a constant effect on 
reducing costs. However, this assumption seems less reasonable, for reasons 
discussed in Section 2.3. It should also be noted that the assumption about costs used 
here is not always innocuous, as illustrated by the results in Chapter 5. 
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Appendix 2 
The value of a, which maximises the welfare of a member of bloc A, in the 
model with constant costs is the value of a, which solves the following equation: 
T(aj =- 
ý «x - ßc)'[16 + 32a 
7 
+144n +390n 
2+ 506n' + 366n 
4+ 144n' + 24n 
6_ 
1 
96a 6 (1 + 2n) + 24a'(1 I+ 24n + 20n 
2 8a 4 13 + 116n + 156n 
2+ 80n' 
12a, (1 + 16n + 94n 
2+ 104n 3+ 40n 4+ 
a2 (44 + 164n + 15 8n 
2- 
408n' - 552n 
4- 192n 5 
a, (-112 - 432n - 71 ln 
2- 632n' - 204n 
4+ 48n' + 32n 
6 )11 / 
P(2 + 3a, + 2a 
2+n )2 2a' + 2(1 + n)2 - a, (3 + 4n) 
3 
1111 
The above function T(al) is positive when a, = 0, negative when a, =n and 
monotonic on the range 0 :! ý aI:! ý 
The value of a, which maximises the welfare of a member of bloc A, in the 
model with decreasing costs is the value of a, which solves the following equation: 
ý 
cc + 4ccal - P(X + 4aX + 4ýt)] 
[cc 




2 2, % ))2 23 [(3 
+ 4a, )(a(a, + 2a, +n)-P(2a, +3g+aj(X+4pt)+Xn-ýin 2+ 3a, + 2a, + n) 
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Chapter 3. 
Trade Bloc Formation with Asymmetric Countries 
62 
3.1. Introduction 
In recent years a number of preferential trade arrangements, including NAFTA 
and agreements between the EU and Eastern European countries, have been 
established which incorporate side agreements covering non-trade issues. Typically 
these agreements contain many concessions by small countries over issues such as 
intellectual property rights and environmental standards, but few concessions by 
larger countries. However, as noted by Perroni and Whalley (1994), the trade 
agreements are generally sought by the small countries, who see themselves as the 
main beneficiaries of such deals despite the concessions they are forced to make. 
The argument put forward by Perroni and Whalley (1994) to explain this 
phenomenon is that the small countries are worried about the risk of global trade war 
and see preferential trade arrangements as insurance against this outcome. Hence they 
are willing to accept the side agreements as payment for the insurance. However, 
while this argument might have seemed persuasive while serious doubts persisted 
over the successful completion of the Uruguay Round, the insurance argument seems 
less tenable now that the Round has been completed. The risk of global trade war 
would appear to have diminished, but many small countries still wish to join larger 
countries in preferential trade arrangements even if their domestic policies are to be 
constrained. The model presented in this chapter suggests that small countries might 
be the main beneficiaries from the fortnation of free trade areas and customs unions, 
and larger countries will often be made worse off. Thus small countries need to 
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compensate large countries in order to persuade them to form trade blocs, and this 
compensation could be provided by side agreements covering non-trade issues. 
The model developed in this chapter is used to address many of the key issues 
in the ongoing debate about the advantages and disadvantages of trade blocs, both to 
member countries and the world as a whole, a comprehensive overview of which is 
provided by Panagariya (1998). Firstly, the effects of the formation or expansion of 
trade blocs on tariffs is considered. Secondly, the effects on members' and non- 
members' welfare are considered. Finally, the issue of whether countries will have 
any incentive to join a trade bloc is addressed. 
The model follows much of the literature on strategic trade policy by assuming 
that firms act as Cournot oligopolists in segmented markets and tariffs can be used to 
shift profits between countries, as in Brander and Spencer's (1984) two-country model 
and Sinclair and Vines's (1994) model of trade blocs, as well as the models in the 
previous chapter. The most significant difference to the models of Sinclair and Vines 
(1994) and Chapter 2 is that countries differ in size, as measured by a demand 
parameter. In all other ways, countries are identical to each other. There is also some 
analysis of the case in which members of a customs union form a single market. 
Allowing for differences between countries is particularly important given recent 
developments in trade blocs, such as the formation of NAFTA and past and future 
expansions of the EU. Whereas most of the early members of the EU could be broadly 
characterised as similar countries, in terms of size and economic development, a 
number of smaller countries have since joined and any subsequent expansions to 
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include Eastern European countries clearly would not involve countries which could 
be treated as being symmetric to existing members. Meanwhile NAFTA consists of 
three countries, the United States, Canada and Mexico, with vastly different levels of 
income. Hence there are many real world issues which cannot be analysed within a 
symmetric framework. 
The effects of trade bloc formation or expansion on tariffs and welfare have 
been much debated since Krugman (1991) suggested that the enlargement of customs 
unions would lead to an increase in protection against countries outside each bloc, so 
the world would be hurt by what appears to be the liberalising step of promoting 
(preferential) free trade. In a monopolistically competitive framework in which 
provinces are divided into symmetric customs unions, it is shown that a reduction in 
the number of customs unions raises the Nash equilibrium tariff set by each bloc, and 
world welfare is minimised when the world is divided into three symmetric customs 
unions. Among the many papers which followed from Krugman's, Sinclair and Vines 
(1994) show that the results are not robust to a change in the type of trade bloc 
considered from customs unions to free trade areas. With free trade areas, it is shown 
that the optimal tariff for each country, setting tariffs independently of other bloc 
members, falls as the size of the blocs rises, although welfare effects are not 
considered. 
Sinclair and Vines (1994) also consider a multi-country oligopoly model based 
on Brander and Krugman (1983) and Brander and Spencer (1984) to analyse the 
efifects of trade blocs. Firms located in different countries produce undifferentiated 
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products and compete in quantities. In this case tariffs are used to shift profits, and it 
is shown that a trend to fewer, larger customs unions could well lead to lower levels 
of protection, and always will do so once the number of symmetric unions has fallen 
to a certain level. The reason for this is that customs union enlargement reduces the 
number of 'foreign' firms with rents to shift. With free trade areas in this model, trade 
bloc enlargement will always reduce tariffs. The results in Section 3.3 support Sinclair 
and Vines's (1994) result on free trade area enlargement, showing that with 
asymmetric countries any expansion of a free trade area will reduce the tariffs set by 
all members of that bloc, while Section 3.4 identifies factors determining whether the 
formation of a customs union will lead to higher or lower tariffs. 
Kennan and Riezman (1990), Riezman (1985) and Kose and Riezman (1998) 
use endowment-based three-country models to analyse the effects of trade bloc 
formation. Kennan and Riezman (1990) show that when partners are symmetric, the 
formation of a free trade area or customs union will always raise the partners' welfare. 
However, whereas the non-member always gains from a free trade area, it could be 
made worse off by a customs umon. 24 Riezman (1985) uses core theory to look at the 
formation of customs unions. Depending on the pattern of endowments, the core could 
contain one or more two-country customs unions or global free trade. Kose and 
Riezman (1998) only consider the case of symmetric endowments. The formation of a 
two-country free trade area raises the welfare of all countries, but a two-country 
24 A case in which the partners are asymmetric is considered in an appendix of Kennan and Riezman 
(1990). It is shown that a free trade area can make one of its members worse off than it would be in the 
Nash equilibrium where all countries set their optimal tariffs. This is because the free trade area 
restricts a large country's ability to use tariffs to improve its terms of trade, and therefore results in a 
loss of market power. 
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customs union raises members' welfare further while making non-members worse off 
In the three-country model analysed in Section 3.6, it is shown that only the smaller 
partner gains from the formation of a free trade area or customs union while the larger 
partner loses. As in Kose and Riezman (1998), the non-member is made better off by 
the formation of a free trade area but worse off by the formation of a customs union. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents a general 
multi-country model of trade where firms compete in quantities and countries differ in 
market size. This model can be used to study free trade, the Nash tariff equilibrium 
and equilibria with Eree trade areas and customs unions. Sections 3.3,3.4 and 3.5 look 
at some effects of the formation of free trade areas, customs unions with segmented 
markets and a customs union with a single market, respectively, on tariffs and 
countries' welfare. Section 3.6 looks in more detail at trade bloc formation in a three- 
country model, and the results are considered in relation to NAFTA. Finally, Section 
3.7 concludes. 
3.2. The general framework 
The world consists of n countries, i=n, of different sizes whose markets 
are segmented. Differences in country size are represented by different levels of 
demand. Specifically, demand in country i is given by yj = oci - Ppi, where pi is the 
market price in country i. It is assumed, without loss of generality, that country 1 is 
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the smallest country (has the lowest level of demand at any price) and country n the 
largest. Hence (xl "-' ()C2 "ýý ... < (Xn- 
The demand equation above leads to the inverse demand function: 
(Xi Yi (3.1) 
It is assumed that a single firm is located in each country, producing a single 
homogeneous good. Finns compete as Cournot oligopolists. Technology is assumed 
to be identical everywhere, with each firm having common, constant marginal cost c. 
Each country can choose whether to set tariffs on imports from each other country, 
however there is one important constraint on these tariffs, which is that each country 
can only set one positive tariff rate. This can be thought of as the country's MFN tariff 
rate, as required under GATT rules. 25 Any country which is not subject to this MFN 
tariff rate faces a zero tariff rate, so preferential trade areas must comply with the 
requirement of Article XXIV of the GATT that trade between members is not 
restricted. Hence imports from countryj to country i face a tariff of iij, where iij = zi if 
j does not have a preferential trade agreement with i and -ry =0 if i andj belong to the 
same trade bloc. 26 The finn in country i earns profits: 
25 Article I of the GATT calls for each country to grant each other country the most favourable 
treatment which it grants to any country, except where differential treatment is specifically allowed, 
such as under Article XXIV which covers customs unions and free trade areas. Effectively this means 
that any country belonging to a trade bloc must set a single MFN tariff rate against imports from all 
non-members. 




-c- Tji) xy (3.2) 
where xij is the quantity sold in countryj by the firm located in country i. The optimal 
output of the firm in country i for the market in country j can be found by 
1 erentiating (3.2) with respect to xu: 
11) - 
CrTli- = pi -c- Irii + 
apj 
XY ax# axq 




The equation above can be rearranged, using the fact that yj XU . to give the 
following expression for output: 
oc 
j PC Pr ii x 4- 2 2k*i 22 
Summing across i leads to an expression for total sales in countryj: 
(3.4) 
Yj :: = 
n (X -n ßc -1 ß2: T ji (3.5) 
n+l j n+I n+1 
From (3.1), the price in countryj is: 
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Pj = 
cc i +- nc+IIT ji (3.6) (n + I)P n+1 n+l i 
Sales of the country i firm in marketj are: 
xy 
Ui PC 
PT ji -I Y-j'r ik (3.7) n+n+ n+l k 
Clearly, given the rules of tariff setting explained earlier, outputs and price in each 
country depend on the tariff level set by that country and the number of countries 
whose imports the tariff is applied to. 
Case 1: Free trade 
Under free trade, iij =0 for all i andj. Using this in (3.7), (3.5) and (3.6) gives 
the following expressions for output, price and demand: 
ocj - PC 
. (3.8) 
n+I 






Total profits earned by the firm located in country i and consumer surplus in country i 
are given by: 
r1i - 
Csi =In ((, i ýC)) (3.12) 20 n+l 
In the absence of any tariffs, each country's welfare is simply the sum of its firm's 
profits and domestic consumer surplus. 
Case 2: Nash tariff equilibrium 
In this case, country i sets a single tariff rate zi on all imports (i. e. iij = -zi Vi# 
0). The firm in country i's output for each market, total consumption in country 
i and the price paid by consumers in i are: 
xii = 
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+c+ (3.16) (n+l)p n+l n+I 
Total profits earned by the firm in country i, consumer surplus in i and tariff revenue 










2p n+l n+I 
TRi =T i(yi -x , 
)= n-1 Ti (ai - Pc - 2pri) 
n+l 
Welfare in this case is defined as the sum of profits, consumer surplus and tariff 
revenue. Each country sets its tariff to maximise welfare, the first order condition for 
which is: 
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aWi n-l [3 
_(ý+7 C) 20) (3 n+l n+l n+ . 
Solving the above equation gives a solution for country i's optimal tariff. 
N_ 3(oc i- Pc) 
(n + 7)p 
Case 3: Preferential trade blocs with segmented markets 
(3.21) 
When a group of countries forms a trade bloc, it is assumed that all countries 
within the bloc abolish tariffs on trade with each other while maintaining a single 
MIFN tariff rate for imports from non-member countries. Here we assume that the 
markets of member countries continue to be segmented, while the following 
subsection analyses the case where the members of a customs union form a single 
market. The first part of the analysis below is not affected by whether a trade bloc 
takes the form of a customs union (with a common external tariff for all members) or 
a free trade area (with each member setting its own external tariffs), but when optimal 
tariff rates are deten-nined, a distinction must be made between the two cases. 
The general model outlined above is used to consider the case where countries 
i andj are members of bloc A(i), with ai members. Country k is located in a different 
bloc A(k) with akmembers. Output, consumption and price can again be found using 
equations (3.7), (3.5) and (3.6): 
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27 Equations (3.26) to (3.28) assume that no country's tariff is sufficiently high to exclude any firms 
from that country's market. This will always be true when a free trade area is formed, but not 
necessarily for a customs union. Appendix 3 derives the condition which must hold for a two-country 
customs union not to lead to any firms exiting a member country's market. When the tariff is 
sufficiently high to force firms to exit a market, as in the three country example of aj oint-welfare 
maximising customs union analysed in Section 3.6 below, profits, consumer surplus and tariff revenue 
have to be calculated taking into account which firms sell in which markets. 
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Again, welfare is the sum of profits, consumer surplus and tariff revenue. In 
the case of a free trade area, each country individually sets its tariff to maximise its 
own welfare, given its membership of the frýee trade area. In the case of a customs 
union, all members must set a single common external tariff. 
Case 4: A customs union with a single market 
This subsection considers the case in which the countries which join a customs 
union form a single integrated market. If a group of countries join a customs union, it 
is assumed that price differences can no longer exist between these countries. Hence if 
a group of countries join bloc A(i), they effectively become a single market. Summing 
the demands of the customs unions members, with each of the ai members constrained 
to have a common price of p,,, means that the single market's demand is given by 
28 
YU = jotj -a i PPu. This case corresponds to the case of 'complete integration' j EA (i) 
identified by Hansen and Nielsen (1997), characterised by a single demand function 
for the whole market, whereas the previous subsection corresponds to their case of 
'partially integrated markets' where demand and price must be considered separately 
for each area. 29 Effectively, all the countries which join a customs union can be 
thought of as a single country on the demand side, although it is assumed that there 
remains a single firm located in each country. 
28 Summing the demand equations in this way assumes that all countries within the single market have 
positive demand at the common price p,,. However it should be noted that this might not be true when 
countries with very different market sizes (very different Ws) form a customs union with a single 
market. 
29 For a fuller account, see Hansen and Nielsen (1997, p. 36). 
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The profit function for the firm in country i, which is one of the ai members of 








while the profit function for country k, located outside the customs union, is 
7r k '- 
(Pu 
-C-Tu 
)Xku + (Pk - C)Xkk +C- Tj)Xkj 
j*k, 
(3.30) 
where xi,, and xk,, are the amounts sold in the customs union by the firms based in 
countries i and k respectively and r,, is the customs union's common external tariff 
Hence the first-order conditions for maximising profits in the integrated customs 
union market are: 
111- 0711 
= Pu -c- 
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jr=A(i) YU Xku 
C-Tu - 
aip aip aip 
(3.32) 
Given that there are now ai firms located within the customs union and (n - aj) 
firms outside, total output sold in the customs union is given by 
yu = aixiu + (n - ai)x,. Using this together with (3.3 1) and (3.32), the following 
expressions can be found for the outputs of firms located inside and outside the 
customs union, respectively: 
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Consumption and price in the integrated market are: 
YU =n lccj -aipc 
ai(n - a) Pr 








+nc+ n-a,. TU 
ai(n+l)p n+l n+1 
(3.36) 
Using this expression in an individual country's demand equation allows the 
derivation of each member country's consumption: 
I 
oc 
Yi = ai - 
jEA(i) 
ai(n + 
n ýc - ai 
n+1n+I 
(3.37) 
Although the customs union members are assumed to form a single market, 
profits and consumer surplus can still be calculated for each member individually. 
However, tariff revenue cannot be calculated for individual members as each firm sets 
its output for the whole single market, meaning that it is not possible to say how much 
of each individual country's consumption comes from any given source. This means 
that it is unclear how much of the good is imported by each member country, so 
imports, and hence tariff revenue, can only be calculated for the union as a whole. 
Thus any analysis of welfare must be made with respect to the union members taken 
together rather than separately. The expressions below give the profits for each firm 
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n-a, Tu ocj - aipc - ai (ai + I)pru (3.40) n+1 jEA(i) 
3.3. Some effects of free trade area formation 
This section derives some results for the formation and expansion of free trade 
areas, while the following section analyses customs unions. Before determining the 
welfare effects on countries which join a trade bloc, it is important to first see how 
bloc membership effects a country's tariff rate against non-members. 
The first case considered is that where ai countries, which previously did not 
belong to any trade bloc, form a free trade area. It should be noted that, due to the 
strategic independence between markets in the model, only the markets in the 
countries forming the free trade area will be affected. 
30 The two important 
30 Other countries are only affected due to changes in the profits they earn in the free trade area 
members' markets. 
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implications of this are first, that the existence of other trade blocs does not affect the 
results, and second, that profits earned in all other markets by firms in the ai countries 
forming the bloc are unaffected. Hence when determining the optimal tariff set by any 
trade bloc member, the parts of welfare which need to be considered are profits earned 
in the members' markets (the first term on the right hand side of equation (3.26)), 
consumer surplus (3.27) and tariff revenue raised on imports from non-members 
(3.28). 
Taking the partial derivative of country i's welfare with respect to its tariff and 
setting it equal to zero gives the following expression for the optimal tariff for country 
i belonging to a free trade area with ai members: 
3(oci - Pc) 
[2(ai + 1)(n + 1) - 3(n -a, )] P 
This leads to the following proposition: 
(3.41) 
Proposition 3.1. Any expansion of afree trade area to include members which did not 
previously belong to any trade bloc will result in lower tariffs 
being set by both the 
new member(s) and existing members. 
Proot Taking the derivative of the tariff set by country i belonging to a 
free trade area 




3(ai - Pc 
2 i3ai (2n + 5)pa i 
which is clearly negative for all positive values of aj. Thus any increase in aj, 
including from ai =1 (the case of a country previously not belonging to any bloc), 
will lower the tariff set by all members of the free trade area. M 
The result that free trade area expansion will reduce members' tariffs supports 
that found by Sinclair and Vines (1994), and the intuition behind the result is similar. 
Forming or joining a free trade area does not increase a country's market power when 
setting tariffs, as each country still sets tariffs independently, but it does reduce the 
number of countries from which tariffs can be raised. Hence the potency of tariffs as a 
profit-shifting device is reduced and optimal tariff rates fall. However the model used 
by Sinclair and Vines (1994), with symmetric countries, only considered free trade 
area expansion as a reduction in the number of symmetric blocs, and is less general 
than the result here that any expansion of any free trade area will lead to lower tariffs. 
In order to see whether any trade blocs will ever be formed, the effects of bloc 
formation on the welfare of member countries must be analysed. The simplest case to 
consider is that where two countries, i and j, form a free trade area. As previously 
noted, the effects on these two countries' welfare are independent of the existence of 
any trade blocs involving other countries. The change in welfare for country i when 
forming a free trade area with countryj is given by: 
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iF _CS i 
N)+(TR 
iF _TR i 
N) 
(3.42) 
where the superscript F denotes free trade area and the superscript N denotes Nash 
tariff equilibrium. Using equations (3.17) to (3.19) and (3.26) to (3.28), together with 
the optimal tariff rates given in equations (3.21) and (3.41), the following expression 
can be obtained for the change in welfare for country i: 
A Wi F 
3[n-2 3(n-l)-(oci _ pC)2 
+ 
2 n+4 n+7 
_ 
(n + 1)2 0 
3(n+2)(n-2) 12(n+4)-(()Cj _ PC)2 
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2_ (n + 1)2 p 
Defining v as v= aj - aj, equation (3.43) can be rewritten as: 
A wF 
3(5n' + 42n 
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3(n + 2)(n - 2) + 
12(n + 4) 
[v 2+ 2v((x Pc)] 
(n + 4)2 (n + 
7)2 
- 
(n + 1)2 0 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
This expression can be used to see the effect of two countries fonning a free trade area 
on the welfare of each of these countries individually and on joint welfare. These 
results are contained in Proposition 3.2. 
Proposition 3.2. Theformation of afree trade area by anypair of countries raises the 
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joint welfare of those countries, and of the world. The welfare of the small country 
will always rise, while the effect on the large country is ambiguous. 
Proot The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.44) is always positive. The 
second term is clearly positive for v>0, so the smaller partner will always gain from 
the formation of a free trade area. For v< Oý in which case i is the larger country, the 
second term is always negative: the necessary condition for this to be so is 
2(ai - Pc) > -v, or equivalently (oci - Pc) + 
(ocj 
- Pc) > 0, which is always true by 
assumption. 31 Te overall sign of (3.44) when v<0 depends on the values of n, cci and 
v. so no general statement can be made about the welfare effect of free trade area 
formation on the larger partner. The effect on the joint welfare of countries i and 
where ccj = oci + v, is unambiguously positive as the second term on the right hand side 
of (3.44) is of equal magnitude and opposite sign for the two countries. As previously 
stated, the first tenn is always positive, so the two partners' joint welfare must rise. 
The welfare of non-members rises due to the fall in external tariffs set by the free 
trade area partners, so world welfare also rises. 0 
To understand the effects of forming the free trade area on one of the partners, 
it is useful to refer back to equation (3.43), the first tenn of which is negative and the 
second ten-n positive. The first term can be interpreted as the 'home market' effect of 
forming the free trade area, as it includes the effects on consumer surplus, profits of 
the domestic firm in its own country and tariff revenue. Consumer surplus rises as the 
31 If this assumption did not hold, the good would not be produced or consumed in at 
least the smaller 
countryj. 
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lower tariff rate and the additional country not subject to that tariff both lead to 
increased competition, a lower price and higher total output, while the same effects 
reduce the profits earned by the firm based in each member country in its own market. 
Tariff revenue falls as the tariff rate falls on joining the free trade area and one less 
supplier is subject to the tariff. The fact that the home market effect is negative means 
that the negative effects of trade bloc formation on own-market profits and tariff 
revenue outweigh the gain in consumer surplus. The second term in equation (3.43) is 
the effect on the domestic firm's profits in its partner country, which is positive as the 
'I'k aDolition of tariffs on trade between partners allows the firm in each of the countries 
which form the free trade area greater access to the market in the other country. It is 
clear from equation (3.43) that the larger is country i, the larger will be the negative 
effect of forming the free trade area, while the larger is its partner countryj, the larger 
will be the positive effect. Hence the largest gains from forming a free trade area will 
accrue to a small country which joins a large partner, and conversely the smallest 
gains or largest losses will accrue to a large country with a small partner. The 
following result, derived from equation (3.43), shows that for sufficiently large values 
of n, when two countries form a free trade area the smaller country will always gain 
while the larger country will always lose. 





Clearly this is positive for i <j and negative for i >j. It can also be seen that, while it 
has already been shown that the formation of a two-country free trade area will always 
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raise the joint welfare of its members, for large values of n the joint gain approaches 
zero as the smaller country gains almost entirely at the expense of its larger partner. 
The results in this section suggest that although the fonnation and expansion 
of free trade areas leads to lower tariffs and an increase in both the joint welfare of 
members and the welfare of non-members, it is far from clear that any free trade areas 
will be fonned. It has been shown above that when the world consists of a large 
number of countries, the larger country will lose when any pair of countries forms a 
free trade area. Section 3.6 below shows that this is also true in a three-country world. 
Thus unless the smaller country, which always gains from the formation of a free 
trade area, is able to compensate its larger partner, it is unlikely that any free trade 
area will form. It is possible that this compensation could take the form of side 
agreements on non-trade issues, thus explaining why many recent trade agreements 
have been accompanied by side agreements typically offering concessions from the 
smaller countries to their larger partners. 
3.4. Some effects of customs union formation 
This section considers the formation of a customs union, within which markets 
remain segmented. The case of countries forming a customs union is more difficult to 
analyse than that of a free trade area. As customs union members set a common 
external tariff on imports from non-members, some tariff-setting rule is needed for the 
customs union as a whole, rather than for each member. Here it is assumed that a 
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customs union sets the tariff which maximises the joint welfare of its members, 
although alternative tariff setting rules could be used. 32 Thus when detennining the 
optimal tariff, its effect on each member's profits, consumer surplus and tariff 
revenue, as given by equations (3.26) to (3.28), must be considered, unlike in the case 
of free trade areas where each country only considered its own welfare when setting 
its tariff. In addition, the possibility of the tariff being high enough to prevent some 
countries from importing from non-members, as mentioned in footnote 27 and 
illustrated in the three-country case analysed in the next section, needs to be taken into 
account. If this does happen, it will only be in the smallest country or countries in the 
customs union that the tariff deters imports as the tariff level needed to prevent 
imports from outsiders is increasing in the size of the country. 33 If the tariff is then 
recalculated to account for the fact that outsiders no longer sell in the smallest 
member countries, the optimal tariff will in fact be higher than that given below as the 
smaller countries effectively weight the common external tariff downwards due to the 
adverse effect of a higher tariff on their consumer surplus and tariff revenue. Hence 
the tariff derived below could be interpreted as the lower bound on the common 
external tariff set by a customs union and the actual tariff rate will be higher if the 
condition set out in the appendix is not satisfied. 
32 Given that countries differ in size, an alternative possibility might be for the larger country to have 
more power within the customs union, so the larger country in any two-country customs union might 
set the tariff which maximises its own welfare, ignoring any effects on the welfare of the smaller 
country. There are also circumstances under which the larger country might prefer to delegate tariff 
setting to its smaller partner, as shown by Gastios and Karp (1991,1995). 
33 Appendix 3 derives the necessary condition for the formation of a two-country customs union not to 
raise tariffs to a sufficient level to prevent outsiders from selling 
in the smaller partner. 
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The problem facing the joint-welfare maximising customs union is to set the 
common external tariff to maximise the sum of the profits earned by all members in 
their own and each others' markets, of members' consumer surplus and of tariff 
revenues earned on imports into the customs union. 34 The case considered is that of a 
customs union A(i) with ai members setting the common external tariff zic 
Differentiating the aggregate welfare of the customs union members with respect to 
the common external tariff and setting equal to zero yields the following expression 
for the optimal tariff- 
(2ai+l) 1](xj-aipc 
JEA(i) 
ai (n + 2a 
2+ 3ai + 2)p i 
(3.45) 
Compared to the case of free trade areas, it is more difficult to analyse the 
effects on tariffs of an expansion of a customs union. Whereas the optimal tariff for a 
member of a free trade area only depended on how many members belonged to the 
bloc, the common external tariff set by a customs union depends not only on how 
many countries are members, but also on the sizes of those countries. Hence it is not 
possible to give a general result regarding the effect of expanding a customs union. 
However, it is possible to identify factors which make a country more or less likely to 
raise its tariff on joining a customs union. Proposition 3.3 below identifies factors 
which affect the likelihood of a country's optimal tariff increasing when it forms a 
customs union with one other country. 
34 As with the fon-nation of a free trade area, profits earned outside the trade bloc are not affected by 
the actions taken by members. 
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Proposition 3.3.91-hen a country forms a customs union with a single partner, its 
optimal tariff is more likely to rise: (a) the more countries there are to raise tariffs 
from; (b) the smaller is the country; and (c) the larger is the country's partner. 
Proot Country i's optimal tariff when not belonging to any trade bloc and the optimal 
common external tariff when it forms a customs union with country j are given, 
respectively, by: 
35 
3(cc i- Pc) 
(n + 7)p 
and Cli, i) i 2(n + 16)p 
(3.46) 
5(ai + aj - 2pc) 
The necessary condition for the second of these tariffs to be higher than the first is: 
+ 61)(ai - Pc) < 5(n + 7)(ccj - Pc) 
This condition is clearly more likely to be satisfied for higher values of n and (xj, and 
for lower values of oci, leading to the proposition. M 
In order to see why the size of the partner countries is important in 
determining a customs union's optimal common external tariff, it is helpful to think of 
this tariff as a weighted average of the tariffs preferred by the two countries. As is 
35 Remember that the customs union's tariff rate would actually be higher if exports from non- 
members to the smaller partner country are prohibited by this tariff rate. This would reinforce the result 
in Proposition 3.3. 
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clear from equation (3.21), in the Nash equilibrium with no trade blocs the larger a 
country is, the larger the tariff it wants to set. Hence when two countries fon-n a 
customs union, it is intuitive that the inclusion of larger countries is likely to lead to 
higher tariffs. The number of countries in the world is important as forming a customs 
union with one other country will significantly reduce the effectiveness of tariffs as a 
profit-shifting device when there are only a few countries to use tariffs against, but 
will be far less important when there are a very large number of countries left subject 
to tariffs. 
Some additional results regarding the effects of two countries forming a 
customs union on tariffs can be found by rewriting the optimal tariff set by a two- 
country customs union and condition (3.46), the necessary condition for a customs 
union to result in a higher tariff being set by country i, in terms of v, defined as in the 
previous section by v= (xj - cci. The tariff rate can be written as: 
cti, jl _ 
5(2oc i+v- 20c) (3.47) 
i 2(n + 16)p 
while an equivalent condition to (3.46) is: 
(4n - 26)(ai - Pc) + 5(n + 7)v >0 (3.48) 
This condition is clearly satisfied for n ý! 7 and v>0. This implies that if the world 
contains at least seven countries, when a customs union is formed by two countries, 
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the common external tariff will always be higher than the small country's tariff before 
joining the customs union. On the other hand, condition (3.48) is clearly violated for n 
: ý- 6 and v<0. Hence if the world consists of no more than six countries, the common 
external tariff set by any two-country customs union will be lower than the larger 
partner's tariff prior to forming the customs union. 
Now the welfare effects of customs union formation between country i and 
countryj, where (xj = cci + v, are analysed. The change in welfare can again be broken 
down into effects on profits, consumer surplus and tariff revenue: 
Cli, j) I-ICIi, i) _rIN A Wi ii)+ 







Using equations (3-17) to (3.19) and (3.26) to (3.28), and the tariff rates given by 
(3.2 1) and (3.47), the change in welfare can be shown to equal: 
AWcl"j) 
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15(n - 2) 
8(n +1)2 (n + 16)p 
12(n + 4) 
v2 (3.50) 
(n + 1)2 (n + 7) 
2P_ 
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The expression above allows us to make the following observations about the 
welfare effects of forming a two-country customs union. Firstly, when v is positive, 
all three terms on the right hand side of (3.50) are positive. This implies that country i 
will always gain from fon-ning a customs union with countryj ifj is larger. When v is 
negative, the second term on the right hand side of (3.50) becomes negative, and the 
overall sign of the expression is ambiguous. Hence the fon-nation of a customs union 
with a smaller country j could raise or lower country i's welfare. The results in 
Section 3.6 below show that in the three-country case which is considered, the 
formation of a customs union between countries I and 2 will reduce country 2's 
welfare. However, it can be seen from equation (3.50) that as n becomes very large, 
the fon-nation of a customs union between two countries can only reduce welfare in 
the larger country when there is a very large difference in the sizes of the two 
countries. This contrasts with the case of a free trade area, where it was shown that 
when n is very large, the larger country will always lose from forming a two-country 
customs union. This suggests that if no compensation is allowed, two countries are 
more likely to form a customs union than a free trade area. 
3.5. Some effects of single market formation 
The case of a single market is similar to the previous case of customs union 
formation, in that the members of the single market again set their common external 
tariff to maximise the joint welfare of members. In this case, the welfare function to 
be maximised is: 
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W=a. rl- + CS. + TR. uIf (3.51) 
where r1j, CSu and TRu are as given by equations (3-38) to (3.40). Differentiating 
welfare with respect to the common external tariff 'ru and setting equal to zero yields 
the following expression for the optimal tariff. 
(2ai + 1) Eccj - aipc 
_jr=A(i) 
ai(n + 2a 
2+ 3ai + 2)p i 
(3.52) 
This tariff can be seen to be identical to that set by the customs union without a single 
market as derived in the previous section. Hence the results concerning tariffs in 
Proposition 3.3 still hold. To understand why the common external tariff is the same 
in both cases, it is helpful to compare equations (3.26) to (3.28) with (3.38) to (3.40). 
It can be seen that summing the former set of equations across customs union 
members gives the latter set of equations. Thus profits, consumer surplus and tariff 
revenue for the union as a whole are the same whether the union has segmented 
markets or a single market, so the optimal common external tariff is the same. 
Although welfare for the union as a whole is the same in both these cases, the 
same is not true for individual countries. The important difference arises in consumer 
surplus. The price in the single market, given by (3.36), lies between the prices in 
individual customs union members with segmented markets, given by (3.25). Hence 
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large customs union members will benefit from a single market as such countries will 
face a lower price and enjoy higher consumer surplus, while small members will be 
worse off with a single market as consumers will face a higher price. 36 Thus it can be 
concluded that with a single market, large countries are more likely to gain from a 
customs union than when markets within the customs union are segmented. 
3.6. The three-country case 
In this section a three-country case is examined in more detail. First the 
benchmark cases of free trade and Nash optimal tariffs are examined, then free trade 
areas, and finally j oint-welfare maximising customs unions. The results are considered 
in the context of NAFTA. 
The analysis in this section is of the special case where (xi = icc, that is where 
the three countries have demand parameters a, 2a and 3a. While this is clearly less 
general than the previous sections, it allows clearer analytical results to obtain. The 
results in this section can be thought of as applying to a case in which there are three 
countries of very different sizes which might join free trade areas or customs unions 
with each other. This seems reasonable when considering NAFTA, where the small 
country I represents Mexico, the medium sized country 2 Canada and the large 
country 3 the United States. 
36 Note that profits earned by each fh-rn are unchanged, while tariff revenue for each individual country 
is indeterminate as explained in Section 3.2. Here it is implicitly assumed that as well as the customs 
union's total tariff revenue remaining unchanged, either individual countries shares of this revenue are 
unchanged or at least any changes are small enough not to offset the changes in consumer surplus. 
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Case 1: Free trade 
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) are used to provide the following expressions for 
welfare in the three countries, with the superscript FT denoting free trade: 
W FT 37cc 









1 090C 2- 78ccpc + 15p2C2 
3 32P 
Case 2: Nash tariff equilibrium 
From equation (3.2 1), the optimal tariffs in the three countries, with the 
superscript N denoting Nash tariff equilibrium, are: 
Ir 
N 3(a - Pc) 
I lop 
N 3(2cc - Pc) T2 - lop 
N 3(3cc - Pc) T3 = 
lop 
Using these tariffs and equations (3-17), (3.18) and (3.19), the following expressions 
can be found for welfare in the three countries: 
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Comparison of welfare for the three countries under free trade and optimal tariffs 
reveals the following results: 
W, FT > W, N W2 FT > W2 N W3 FT < W3 N 
Hence countries 1 and 2 prefer free trade to the Nash tariff equilibrium, whereas the 
larger country 3 prefers the Nash equilibrium. This offers support to the result that in 
strategic trade policy models, as in neoclassical trade theory, large countries can gain 
from tariff wars. 
Case 3a: Free trade areas 
There are three possible free trade areas between pairs of countries in the 
three-country model. The main case considered here is a free trade area between 
countries 1 and 2. the two losers in the tariff war considered above. Tariffs in the two 
countries forming the free trade area are given by equation (3.29), while due to the 
strategic independence between markets, the optimal tariff decision facing country 3 
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is the same as in the Nash tariff equilibrium above. Hence the optimal tariffs when 
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3(3a - ýc) 
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Comparing these tariffs to those set by countries I and 2 in the Nash tariff 
equilibrium, it is clear that the formation of a free trade area results in a reduction in 
the tariffs both these countries set on imports from country 3, in line with Proposition 
3.1. 
Using these tariff rates together with equations (3.26), (3.27) and (3.28) gives 
the following results for welfare in countries 1 and 2: 
W, F(1,2) - 
379 1(X 2- 5394ocpc +2 lggp2C2 
4900P 
FjI, 2) W2 
4900P 
Country 3 benefits from the formation of a free trade area by countries I and 2. 
Country 3's consumer surplus, domestic market profits and tariff revenue are all 
unchanged, while examination of the tariff rates before and after the formation of the 
free trade area and equations (3.17) and (3.26) shows that the reduction in the tariffs 
set by both free trade area partners is sufficient to increase the profits earned by the 
firm located in country 3 in these markets. Comparison of welfare in the three 
784 la2 - 8094ocpc +2 
lggp2C2 
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countries in the Nash tariff equilibrium and in a free trade area leads to the following 
results: 
W, F(1,2) > W, N W2 F(1,2) < W2 N W3 Ff 1,21 > W3 N 
These results arise from the effects explained in Section 3.3 above. Each member 
country gains profits in its partner's market at the expense of profits in its own market 
as a result of the reciprocal abolition of tariffs on intra-bloc trade, while both countries 
increase consumer surplus and lose tariff revenue. The crucial factor determining why 
one country gains and the other loses is the difference in size between the two 
countries. The smaller country I gains unrestricted access to a larger market while 
losing market share in its own smaller market, whereas country 2 gains market share 
in a small market while losing out in its own larger market. In addition, the loss of 
tariff revenue is more significant in country 2, which was raising a larger tariff on 
more imports than country 1. Therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that the smaller 
country gains partly at the expense of the larger country. However, the joint welfare of 
the two countries increases when they form a free trade area, as does world welfare, in 
line with Proposition 3.2. But since country 2 loses from this move, the free trade area 
is only likely to be formed if there is a possibility of redistribution from country 1 to 
country 2. 
When the two other possible free trade areas (country 3 with either country 1 
or country 2) are analysed, similar results emerge. In each case, the two partners 
reduce their tariffs against the third country, while welfare rises in the smaller partner, 
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falls in the larger partner and rises in the third country. Again, joint welfare of the 
partners, and of the world, rises. 
Case 3b: Joint welfare maximising customs union 
The case of a customs union between countries I and 2 differs from that of a 
free trade area between the same countries only in that the two partners now set a 
common external tariff, TC, which is assumed to be the tariff which maximises joint 
welfare. As is shown in Appendix 3, the formation of any customs union in a three- 
country world will raise the small country's tariff enough to prevent the outsider from 
selling in that country. To illustrate this, note that the optimal common external tariff 
given by equation (3.33), assuming that all firms continue to sell in all markets, is 
5(3a - 2pc)/38P. However, from equation (3.23) it can be seen that output from 
country 3 sold in country 1 equals (a - Pc - 3prl)/4, which will be negative given the 
tariff rate above. Hence to find the actual common external tariff set by the customs 
union it is first assumed that country 3 does not sell in country 1, leaving this market 
as a duopoly while three firms still compete in countries 2 and 3. The joint-welfare 
maximising tariff is calculated for this case, and then it is checked to ensure that this 
tariff level is indeed sufficiently high to exclude country 3 from the market in country 
1. Given the change in market structure in country 1, and taking account of the 
changes in profits for all three countries and country l's consumer surplus and tariff 
revenue (which is now zero), the first-order condition for maximising the joint welfare 
of the customs union members becomes: 
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I+w 2) ar C 
5(2a - Pc) - 19p-, c 
16P (3.39) 
Solving the first-order condition above gives a tariff level of 5(2ot - Pc)119p, which is 
again high enough to exclude the firm located in country 3 from selling in country 1. 
Hence this is the optimal common external tariff, and noting that country 3's optimal 
tariff will be the same as in the Nash equilibrium and free trade area cases, the tariff 
rates for the case where countries 1 and 2 form a joint welfare maximising customs 
union are: 
. 
C(1,2) C11,21 5(2oc - Pc) TI ý- T2 19P 
Cf 1,2) 
3 
3(3a - ýc) 
lop 
The common external tariff in this case can be seen to lie between the optimal tariff 
rates set by countries 1 and 2 in the Nash equilibrium, but it is higher than the rate set 
by either country when 1 and 2 form a free trade area. Hence a customs union is 
clearly more restrictive against the outside country than a free trade area. It is 
interesting to see whether a customs union is also more restrictive against exports 
from country 3 than the Nash tariff equilibrium, and this is investigated by comparing 
country 3's sales in countries I and 2 in the latter case to country 3's sales in the 
customs union (remembering that country 3 will in this case only export to country 
2). 37 Using equations (3.14) and (3.23), and the optimal tariffs in the Nash tariff 
37 Under Article XXIV of the GATT, one of the conditions for countries forming a preferential trade 
bloc is that the bloc should be no more restrictive against outside countries than the member countries 
together were before forming a trade bloc. An obvious way of seeing whether this condition is satisfied 
is to compare imports from outside countries before and after the bloc is formed. 
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equilibrium and when countries I and 2 fonn a joint-welfare maximising customs 
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3(x - 2pc N+N 32 
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Hence the formation of the customs union reduces country 3's exports to a lower level 
than in the Nash tariff equilibrium. This raises doubts as to whether such a customs 
union would be allowed under Article XXIV of the GATT, which states that a trade 
bloc should not increase the level of protection against those countries which are not 
members. 
Welfare in each country is defined as before as the sum of profits earned by 
the domestic firm, consumer surplus and tariff revenue. 
W, C11,21 
_ 




ICC 2- 543494apc + 15229gp2C2 
324900P 
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6518(X 2- 4352(xpc + 727p2C2 
1805P 
As with a free trade area, the formation of a customs union between 1 and 2 leads to a 
welfare gain for 1 and a loss for 2. However the gain for country I is bigger with a 
customs umon than a free trade area, and although it is ambiguous which is larger for 
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country 2, the two countries together are better off forming a customs union than a 
free trade area. Meanwhile, the effect on country 3 of the other two countries forraing 
a customs union is the opposite of the effect of free trade area formation. Due to the 
increased level of protection implied by a move from the Nash tariff equilibrium to a 
customs union, country 3's welfare falls, whereas the formation of a free trade area 
was shown to raise the outsider's welfare. Hence a customs union raises members' 
joint welfare at the expense of the outsider, while a free trade area makes members (in 
aggregate) and the outsider better off 
Case 4: A single market 
The final case to analyse is that where countries I and 2 form a customs union 
with a single internal market. The tariff which maximises the union's welfare, r, is 
found using equation (3.52), while the excluded country 3 will set its Nash 
equilibrium tariff as before. Hence the tariff rates are: 
TU _ 
5(3a - 2PO T3- 
3(3a - Pc) 
38P lop 
Welfare for the union members can be found by using these tariff rates along 
with equations (3.38) to (3.40). As was explained in Section 3.2, the assumption of a 
single market for the union members means that tariff revenue, and consequently 
welfare, cannot be calculated for the individual member countries, 
but only for the 
union as a whole. Welfare for the union of countries I and 2 and 
for country 3 are 
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given by the following expressions, where the superscript u 11,21 denotes a customs 
union between countries 1 and 2 with a single market: 
Wufl, 2) 
= 
791730C 2- 101232apc + 33022p2C2 
u 36100P 
W ull, 2) 
3 
66330C 2- 4512ocpc + 782p2C2 
1805P 
Although the results in Section 3.5 suggest that usually welfare will be the 
same in a customs union with or without a single market, that does not hold true in 
this specific example because of the fact that the firm located in country 3 did not sell 
in country 1 in the case with segmented markets. Comparing the welfare of the union 
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From these expressions the sign of the difference in welfare for the customs union 
members I and 2 is ambiguous, but country 3 is better off when they form a single 
market. 
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The three-country model is appropriate for considering the economic rationale 
underlying the formation of NAFTA, taking Mexico to be the small country 1, Canada 
the medium-sized country 2 and the United States the large country 3. The results in 
this section suggest that the United States would be better off in the Nash equilibrium 
than either in a two-country free trade area with Canada or in a free trade area 
covering all three countries (taken to be equivalent to the case of free trade here), 
assuming that no side payments were given. However, the various side agreements, 
covering such issues as the enviromnent and labour standards, which were introduced 
alongside NAFTA could be seen as welfare improving for the United States, and thus 
could constitute the compensation needed to induce the United States to form the free 
trade area. Thus the model in this paper offers an explanation as to why Mexico was 
prepared to make a number of concessions to gain entry to NAFTA while the United 
States was not required to reciprocate. 
3.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the effects of the fonnation of free trade areas and 
customs unions in a world where countries differ in market size and firms act as 
Cournot oligopolists. It has been shown that the formation or expansion of a free trade 
area will always lead to a reduction in members' tariffs and a rise in the joint welfare 
of both members and non-members. The effect of the formation of a two-country 
customs union on each country's tariff is generally ambiguous. A country's tariff is 
more likely to rise when (a) there are more countries to raise tariffs from; (b) the 
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country is small; and (c) the country's partner is large. The welfare of the smaller 
country will always rise, while the effect on the larger country is ambiguous. If the 
customs union members form a single market, the larger country is likely to have 
higher welfare, and the smaller country lower welfare, than when markets remain 
segmented. 
The results in this chapter suggest there is unlikely to be any incentive for 
forming a free trade area unless transfers between partners are possible, while the 
result for customs unions is less clear. The results for the three-country model show 
that while the formation of a two-country free trade area or customs union will raise 
the joint welfare of its members, in each case the larger member's welfare falls in 
comparison to the Nash tariff equilibrium. Hence the smaller partner would need to 
compensate the larger partner to form a trade bloc. Comparing the results for a free 
trade area and a customs union., joint welfare of the members is higher in the latter 
case. However, when a free trade area is formed the non-member also gains, whereas 
the non-member loses from the formation of a customs union. 
The fact that small countries gain from trade bloc membership while large 
countries often lose provides a rationale for the numerous concessions by small 
countries on non-trade issues which have recently been seen to accompany 
preferential trade agreements. For example, the side agreements on the environment 
and labour standards which Mexico signed when joining NAFTA can be viewed as a 
transfer from Mexico to the United States to induce the United States to sign a 
welfare-reducing trade agreement. 
104 
Appendix 3. 
This appendix derives the necessary condition for the fortnation of a two- 
country customs union not to raise the smaller country's tariff to such an extent that it 
will no longer import from outside the customs union. It is assumed that countries i 
and j form a customs union, with oci <ocj. Sales of the firm located in a non-member 




where zC, the customs union's common external tariff, is (from equation (3.30)): 
5(a i+aj- 2pc) 
2(n + 16)p 
(A3.2) 
Substituting (A3.2) into (A3.1) gives the following expression for sales by the country 
k finn in country i: 
(2n + 1)(ai - Pc) - 15(aj - Pc) 
Xki 
2(n + 16)p 
From (A3.3), it is clear that xki >0 when 
(A3.3) 
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(2n + 1)(ai - Pc) > 15(ocj - Pc) 
Remembering that ai <(xj, this condition clearly cannot be satisfied for n :! ý 7, so in a 
world consisting of no more than seven countries, the formation of a customs union 
between any pair of countries will raise the smaller country's tariff sufficiently to 
prevent outsiders from selling in that country. For larger values of n, the identity of 
the countries forming the customs union is important. For example, with n= 10, the 
nlk . bove condition becomes 21(oci - Pc) > 15((xj - Pc). Clearly in this case two countries 
would need to be of similar sizes for the common external tariff not to be so high as to 
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4.1. Introduction 
The trade policy literature has identified two main cases where intervention in 
international trade may be welfare improving for a country. In conventional trade 
theory, a large country able to influence its tenns of trade can gain by using an 
optimum tariff or export tax and, in the new trade theory, a country can use strategic 
trade policies to shift profits to the domestic firm and/or to extract rent from foreign 
finns. In both these cases, trade policy is generally a beggar-my-neighbour policy 
where intervention by one country increases its welfare at the expense of the other 
country. When both countries intervene, setting trade policy in a non-cooperative 
manner, the outcome will typically be a prisoners' dilemma where both countries are 
worse off and aggregate world welfare is undoubtedly lower than under free trade. 39 
In contrast, this chapter presents a model of strategic trade policy under integrated 
markets, with incomplete information about costs, where non-cooperative trade policy 
39 
setting yields higher welfare than under free trade for both countries. 
Although the literature on strategic trade policy is now very extensive, see 
Brander (1995) for a recent survey, it has concentrated almost exclusively on the case 
of segmented markets, with only a few papers dealing with the case of integrated 
38 As Johnson (1953-54) has shown, in the case of the terms of trade argument, one country may gain 
compared to ftee trade but the other country will always lose. Similar results have also been obtained 
in strategic trade policy models. 
39 Other papers that look at Pareto-improving trade policy, such as Anis and Ross 
(1992), consider a 
policy change by one country that improves the welfare of both countries 
but they do not show that 
non-cooperative trade policy setting yields higher welfare 
for both countries than under free trade. 
Bagwell and Staiger (1989) present a model where export subsidies are used to signal product quality 
and where intervention by both countries can 
be welfare improving. 
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markets. 40 The assumption of segmented markets means that there is no possibility of 
arbitrage between markets so firms regard each country as a separate market. Together 
with the usual assumption of constant marginal cost this implies that one market can 
be analysed independently of any other markets which greatly simplifies the analysis 
of trade policy. However, the lack of any interaction between markets is a very 
unappea ing feature of these models. The alternative assumption of integrated markets 
means that there is perfect arbitrage between markets, and hence firms sell in an 
integrated world market. In the absence of transport costs, perfect arbitrage implies 
that any price differences between markets must be entirely due to trade policies. 
Thus, with integrated markets it is not possible to analyse one market independently 
of the others, making the modelling of strategic trade policy under integrated markets 
more difficult than when markets are segmented. With world markets becoming more 
integrated, the assumption of segmented markets seems less tenable when firms 
regard the global economy as their market place. Consequently, the first aim of this 
chapter is to analyse strategic trade policy under integrated markets with complete 
information. 
A recent innovation in the literature on strategic trade policy has been the 
introduction of incomplete information. 41 In a Cournot duopoly model based upon 
Brander and Spencer (1985), Collie and Hviid (1993) show that an export subsidy can 
be used to signal information about the competitiveness of the domestic firm when the 
40 Notable exceptions that deal with trade policy under integrated markets are Markusen and Venables 
(1988), Venables (1994) and Fisher and Wilson (1995). 
41 Apart from this paper, the rest of the literature on strategic trade policy under incomplete 
information assumes that markets are segmented. 
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foreign firm has incomplete information about the domestic fin-n's costs. Similarly, 
Collie and Hviid (1999) show that a tariff can be used to signal the uncompetitiveness 
of the domestic firm when incomplete information about costs is added to the Brander 
and Spencer (1984) model. Brainard and Martimort (1996) extend the Brander and 
Spencer (1985) model of profit-shifting export subsidies by assuming that the 
domestic government has incomplete information about the costs of the domestic 
firm. Assuming that the collection of govenunent revenue is costly, they derive the 
optimal export subsidy and lump-sum payment scheme that ensures the truthful 
revelation of costs by the domestic firm. The model analysed by Qiu (1994) combines 
both signalling and truthful revelation under Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly. As 
Brander (1995) notes in his survey of strategic trade policy "(t)he existence of 
informational asymmetries seems both indisputable and important". Therefore, the 
second aim of this chapter is to introduce incomplete information about the costs of 
both firms into the model of strategic trade policy under integrated markets, and to 
analyse how both govenunents can use trade policy to signal about the costs of their 
domestic firm. 
Section 4.2 highlights the differences between the assumptions of segmented 
and integrated markets, and introduces the trade policy instrument, a combination of 
an import tariff with an equal export subsidy, used in this chapter and Chapter 5. 
Section 4.3 presents the model of strategic trade policy under integrated markets with 
complete information, where two firms each located in a separate country compete as 
Cournot duopolists in an integrated world market. In Section 4.4, the optimal trade 
policy of a country is shown to be an import tariff if the country is a net importer and 
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an export subsidy if the country is a net exporter. When both countries set trade policy 
non-cooperatively, the outcome is the Nash equilibrium in trade policies where the 
country that has the finn with the lower costs will give an export subsidy which is 
fully countervailed by the import tariff set by the other country. The country that has 
the firra with the lower cost will be worse off while the other country will be better off 
than under free trade. Section 4.5 extends the model presented in Section 4.3 by 
adding incomplete information about the costs of the two firms. The separating 
equilibria of this signalling game are derived in Section 4.6. Taking the expected trade 
policy of the other country as given, it is shown that a country can use its trade policy 
to signal about the domestic firm's costs. The export subsidy (import tariff) in the 
separating equilibrium is larger (smaller) than the optimum under complete 
information. Section 4.7 derives the separating equilibrium of the simultaneous 
signalling game, and shows that the country with the low (high) cost firm will have 
the higher (lower) expected trade policy. In the symmetric case, the expected welfare 
of both countries in the separating equilibrium is higher than under free trade; this 
welfare gain arises from increased specialisation according to comparative advantage. 
4.2. Integrated versus segmented markets. 
Most of the literature on trade under imperfect competition assumes that 
markets are segmented, so it is important to underline the difference between that 
assumption and the alternative assumption of integrated markets used in this paper. 
The assumption of segmented markets means that all firms consider each country to 
ill 
be, and are able to treat each country as, a separate market. Finns which compete in 
quantities make a separate output decision for each market, independently of their 
decisions in all other markets, and there is no possibility of arbitrage between markets. 
Hence, assuming constant returns to scale, the market in any country can be analysed 
independently of those in all other countries. 
In contrast, when the alternative assumption of integrated markets is made, 
there is perfect arbitrage between markets. Finns sell in an integrated world market, 
and perfect arbitrage ensures that no price differences can exist between markets 
unless they are caused by transport costs and/or trade policies. Thus with integrated 
markets it is not possible to analyse the market in any one country independently of 
all other countries. 
The assumption of integrated markets means that care must be taken when 
defining the trade policy instrument used by a trade bloc, as the arbitrage assumption 
implies some restrictions on the choice of trade policy. To see this, consider the case 
of two countries, indexed i=1,2, which produce and consume a single homogeneous 
good, and which each set a tariff -ri on imports and a subsidy si on exports of this 
good. Assuming zero transport costs, the following arbitrage condition is necessary to 
prevent consumers in country I from being able to buy the good more cheaply in 
country 2: 
42 
42 If there were positive transport costs involved in trade between the two countries, the arbitrage 
conditions below would not need to hold. Assuming that the transport cost was equal for trade in either 
direction, prices between the two countries could differ by the amount of this transport cost in addition 
to any difference allowed by the trade policies. 
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A ýýP2 - 32 +'rl 
If this condition is not satisfied, it would be cheaper to buy the good in country 2 and 
transport it to country 1, receiving the export subsidy and paying the import tariff, 
rather than simply buying the good in country 1. A similar arbitrage condition is 
needed to prevent consumers in country 2 from buying the good in country 1- 
P2 ýýPl - Sl +C2 
It is immediately apparent that the introduction of export subsidies alone (i. e. 
'r I : --- T2 ý 
0) is not feasible with integrated markets. In this case, with both subsidies 
non-negative and at least one strictly positive, it is not possible for both inequalities 
n1l aDove to hold. An arbitrageur could repeatedly export a good from the country giving 
the subsidy and reimport the good, each time receiving the export subsidy but paying 
no import tariff, so export subsidies used alone clearly allow profitable arbitrage. 
Now, to see under what conditions it might be possible to use export subsidies, 
consider the case where country 2 is passive (i. e. 'r2 ý S2 = 0) and only country 1 uses 
trade policy. Using the two arbitrage conditions above, it can be seen that a necessary 
condition for country l's trade policy to be compatible with integrated markets is -ij ý! 
sj. In other words, country I must set an import tariff which is at least as high as the 
export subsidy it sets. To see why this is necessary, consider what would happen if a 
good produced in country 1 were exported to country 2 and then reimported by an 
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arbitrageur. The arbitrageur would collect an export subsidy of s, on exporting the 
good and pay an import tariff of TI. Thus if s, > T,, the arbitrageur could repeatedly 
export and reimport the good, making a profit of sl - rl each time. Hence it can be 
seen that each government, to be sure of preventing this type of profitable arbitrage, 
can only use an export subsidy if it is accompanied by an equal or greater import 
tariff. 41 
In this chapter and Chapter 5 the trade policy instrument used is an export 
subsidy and an import tariff set at an equal rate. This is sufficient to allow for the 
analysis of export subsidies under integrated markets, as explained above, while also 
ensuring markets remain truly integrated, avoiding the anti-competitve effct 
associated with import tariffs. 44 To see how trade policy could be used to keep 
markets segmented, suppose a country set a tariff greater than its export subsidy, 
which is consistent with the analysis above. This effectively allows that country to 
artificially segment its market, as the tariff partially insulates producers in the country 
from foreign competition and raises the price they are able to charge for their product. 
Hence it is argued that the use of an import tariff higher than that country's export 
subsidy is a way of keeping markets segmented, and consequently not consistent with 
the analysis of integrated markets. The use of an export subsidy and an import tariff 
set at an equal rate allows the analysis of export subsidies under integrated markets 
43 A similar condition applies to import subsidies, namely that any import subsidy must be 
accompanied by an equal or greater export tax to ensure there are no opportunities for profitable 
arbitrage. In this case bothr, and s, are negative, so againr, ý! sl. 
44 The anti-competitive effect of conventional tariffs when markets are integrated has been shown by 
Venables (1994) and Fisher and Wilson (1995) under Bertrand oligopoly, while Collie (1998) has 
shown how this combined trade policy instrument will avoid these anti-competitive effects. 
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while also ensuring that markets are not artificially segmented. An additional 
advantage of this trade policy instrument is that it greatly simplifies the analysis of 
trade policy under integrated markets, as it implies a single arbitrage condition which 
must hold with equality instead of two inequalities. 
Integrated and segmented markets are both extreme assumptions, but despite 
the fact that the literature on trade under imperfect competition is mainly concentrated 
on the case of segmented markets, this assumption does not seem closer to reality than 
the alternative. Generally, as trade barriers are removed and global markets become 
more integrated, it seems reasonable to suggest that the world is moving away from a 
situation of segmented markets and closer to a single global market. Therefore a 
greater understanding of models of trade under integrated markets is important. 
The literature on trade policy under segmented markets is extensive and the 
main results are well known. Brander (1995) provides a comprehensive survey of the 
literature on strategic trade policy, the vast majority of which assumes segmented 
markets. The literature using the alternative assumption of integrated markets is far 
smaller. Strategic trade policy under integrated markets was previously analysed by 
Markusen and Venables (1988), but they only consider small deviations from free 
trade, not optimal policy. In their textbook, Heffernan and Sinclair (1990) consider the 
effect of a tariff where firms have the same marginal costs. Trade policy under 
integrated markets with Bertrand competition is analysed by Collie (1998). 
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4.3. The basic model with complete information. 
The world economy consists of two countries: country 1 and country 2; 
variables relating to country I will be labelled by a subscript I and those relating to 
country 2 by a subscript 2. The markets of the two countries are integrated; hence, in 
the absence of transport costs, perfect arbitrage ensures that any price difference 
between the two markets is due entirely to trade taxes and subsidies. A single firm is 
located in each country and these two firms compete as Cournot duopolists in the 
integrated world market. Demand in the two markets is assumed to be identical and 
given by the linear demand functions yj = (x - Ppi for i=1,2, where yj is 
consumption and pi is the price in the ith market. The firm in the ith country has 
constant marginal cost ci and produces output xi ; it is assumed that ci < oc/ P since 
4 
otherwise a fin-n will never produce any output. Net imports of the ith country are 
given by domestic consumption minus domestic production: m, = yj - xi . With only 
two countries, market clearing will ensure that total consumption of the good is equal 
to total production of the good in the integrated world market so y, + y, = x, + x, 
which implies that M, +M2 = 0. The governments of the two countries each set the 
trade policy instrument described below to maximise their national welfare. 
Formally, trade policy setting is modelled as a two stage game where the two 
governments simultaneously set trade policies in the first stage, and then in the second 
stage the two firms compete as Cournot duopolists given the trade policies set by the 
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two govemments. As usual, the game is solved for the subgame perfect equilibrium 
by backwards induction. 
Demand in the integrated world market is the sum of demands in the two 
countries. Since the two markets are integrated, perfect arbitrage will ensure that 
prices in the two markets will differ only by the amount of any trade policies which 
-": P2 unctions in the two countries, implies that A- tI "- t2 . Summing the demand f 
then using the arbitrage and market clearing conditions, yields the inverse demand 
functions facing the two firms in the integrated world market as functions of their 
outputs: 
xj+ xj ti - li + 2p 2 
1,2 i# i (4.1) 
Hence, the slope of the inverse demand function facing the ith firm is 
api laxi =- 1/2 P. The two firms compete as Coumot duopolists in the integrated 
world market, and the profits of the firm in the ith country are 7E i= 
(pi 
- ci) xi . 
Assuming an interior solution where both firms produce positive output, the first order 
conditions for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium are: 
d97c i ei 




Substituting the inverse demand functions (4.1) into these first order conditions and 
then solving for the Coumot-Nash equilibrium outputs yields 45 
Xi =2 
(oc 
- 2pci + Pcj) + P(ti - tj) i, j=1,2 i#j (4.3) 3 
The effect of an import tariff or export subsidy, tj . 
is to increase the output of 
the domestic firm, axi lati = P, and to reduce the output of the foreign firm by an 
equal amount, axi lati =-P; therefore, total production in the integrated world 
market is unchanged. Using the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs (4.3) in the inverse 
demand functions (4.1) yields the prices in the two markets: 
I (oc+ PC, + PC, )+ 
1 (ti - ti) 3p 2 1,2 i# i 
(4.4) 
The effects of trade policy, tj , on prices 
in the two markets are api lati = 1/2 
and apj lat, =- 1/2 ; hence, half of an import tariff is passed through to domestic 
consumers while half is absorbed by the foreign firm, and half of an export subsidy is 
passed through to foreign consumers while half is absorbed by the domestic firm. 
Substituting these prices (4.4) into the demand functions of the two countries gives 
consumption in the two markets: 
45 With linear demand, since profit functions are concave, the second-order conditions for profit- 
maximisation are satisfied and there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium. 
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Yi =1 2oc- Pc, - 
Pc2)- tj) 
32 
Trade policy, ti, reduces consumption 
i, j=1,2 i# j (4.5) 
in the domestic market, 
ýyj lati =- 0/2, and increases consumption in the foreign market by the same 
amount, ýyj lati = P/2 ; therefore, total consumption in the integrated world market is 
unchanged. Net imports are the difference between domestic consumption and 
domestic production in a country so mi = yj - xi and market clearing implies that 
mi =- mj ; hence, using (4.3) and (4.5), net imports of ith country are: 
Mi = p(ci - Ci) - 
3p (ti 
- ti) = -mi i, j= 1,2 i# j (4.6) 2 
Since trade policy, tj ý 
increases domestic production and reduces domestic 
consumption, it will reduce the ith country's net imports, ami lati =-3 P/2, and 
increase the other country's net imports by the same amount, amj lati =3 P/2 - 
Equations (4.3) to (4.6) describe the equilibrium of the integrated world 
market as a function of the trade policies set by the two governments. Ignoring 
distributional questions and assuming that preferences are quasi-linear, the welfare of 
a country is given by the sum of consumer surplus, the profits of the domestic firm, 
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and government revenue from trade PoliCY. 
46 Thus, the welfare of each country is 
given by: 
Yi 1 
Wi f(cc - Pq)dq - p, y, + 7c, +tm _Y2 P0i 2p i+ 
(Pi 
- ci)xi + timi Iý2 (4.7) 
Before looking at trade policy, the question of whether there are gains from 
trade under oligopoly with integrated markets will be briefly considered. Setting 
ti =t 2= 
0 in (4.3) to (4.6) gives output, prices, consumption and net imports under 
Eree trade, and substituting these into (4.7) yields the welfare of the ith country under 
free trade: 
WF=2 (2oc - Pc, - Pcj)(oc - 2pci + Pcj) +P 
(Ci 
_ Cj)2 i, j = 1,2 i- 9p 2 
(4.8) 
In autarky, since the domestic firm faces no competition from the foreign firm, 
it can set the monopoly price in the domestic market and earn monopoly profits. It is 
straightforward to show that the welfare of the ith country under autarky is 
WA 
= 3(cc- Pc i) 
2 /8 P, and obviously there are gains I 
from trade if 
i AW = WF _ WA: ý. 0. ii It can be shown that A Wi has a minimum at 
ci = 
(1 3a+ 28 Pcj) /41 P where its value is AW= 
( 
I a_ 
PCj) 2 /82p> 0; hence, there 
46 For an import tariff, government revenue is positive since trade policy is positive and net imports are 
positive while, for an export subsidy, government revenue is negative since trade policy is positive and 
net imports are negative. 
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are always gains from trade whatever the relative costs of the two firms. 47 In other 
models of international trade with imperfect competition under integrated markets, 
such as Markusen (1981), it is generally shown that a sufficient condition for gains 
from trade is that the output of the domestic industry expands under free trade. Here, 
it has been shown that there are gains from trade even if the output of the domestic 
firm contracts under free trade. An important point to note is that there will be gains 
. 
C-- - 
from trade in the symmetric case, when both firms have the same costs, even though 
net imports will be equal to zero. These gains arise from the possibility of trade that 
introduces competition between the two firms, leading to lower prices, and a 
consequent reduction in the deadweight loss from monopoly. 
4.4. Trade policy with complete information 
In this oligopolistic industry, a government can use trade policy to shift profits 
to its domestic firm and to improve the terms of trade by extracting rent from the 
foreign firm. This section firstly analyses the optimal trade policy of a country while 
taking the trade policy of the other country as given, and then analyses the Nash 
equilibrium in trade policies when both countries set them simultaneously. The 
optimal trade policy for the ith country is given by maximising its welfare (4.7) with 
respect to t, . while taking tj as given, which yields 
the first order condition: 
47 The assumption that demand in both markets is identical is important, since it is possible that a 
country could lose from trade if its market was much larger than the market in the other country, see 
Markusen (199 1). Surprisingly, this suggests that cost differences should be a less important issue in 
trade liberalisation than differences in the size of the markets. 
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wi x = Mi + (Pi - ci) -ý-i + ti 0i=1,2 (4.9) ati ati ati 
Solving for the optimal trade policy yields: 
ami 
at. ti = mi(, -PP--i) 
ýX-i )(- ai+ (pi - ci) at,. 
i=1ý2 (4.10) 
at, at, ati 
Since the denominator is clearly positive, the overall sign of the optimal trade 
policy depends upon the terms in the numerator. The first tenn in the numerator is the 
terms of trade effect which is positive (negative) if net imports are positive (negative) 
and the second terin is the profit-shifting effect which is positive. Hence, if a country 
is a net importer then the optimal trade policy is an import tariff, but if it is a net 
exporter then the optimal policy seems to be ambiguous. However, noting that 
pi - ci ---: xi /2 P from (4.1) and (4.2), that axi lati =P from (4.3), and that 
api /c9ti = 1/2 from (4.4), the optimal trade policy can be shown to be t: = yj /3 P 
which is positive if domestic consumption is positive; this leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 4.1. The optimal trade policyfor a country is an import tariff if it is a net 
importer and an export subsidy if it is a net exporter. 
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When the country is a net importer, both the terms of trade effect and the 
profit-shifting effect are positive, hence the optimal policy is a positive import tariff 
which is similar to the result in Brander and Spencer (1984) for segmented markets. 
When the country is a net exporter, the positive profit-shifting effect outweighs the 
negative terms of trade effect, hence the optimal policy is an export subsidy which is 
similar to the result in Brander and Spencer (1985) for segmented markets. The 
optimal policies under integrated markets are generally smaller than those under 
segmented markets as the greater degree of competition in the former case results in 
smaller price-cost margins and thus reduces the effect of strategic trade policies. The 
analysis can be extended to the case of many firms in each country without much 
difficulty. If the country is a net importer then the optimal policy is always an import 
tariff, but if the country is a net exporter then the optimal policy may be an export tax 
if the number of domestic firms is large relative to the number of foreign firms as in 
Dixit (1984) for segmented markets. The analysis can also be extended to the case 
when the country uses a production subsidy as well as trade policy. In this case, the 
optimal policy is a production subsidy to ensure that price is equal to the marginal 
cost of the domestic finn and an import tariff or export tax to improve the terms of 
trade. 
When both governments set trade policy non-cooperatively the result will be a 
trade policy war which is best analysed as the Nash equilibrium of this single-shot 
game. In the Nash equilibrium in trade policies, each government simultaneously and 
independently sets trade policy to maximise its national welfare. The first step in 
analysing the Nash equilibrium is to derive the best-reply functions that give the 
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optimal trade policy of the ith country as a function of the trade policy of the jth 
country. Using equations (4.3) to (4.6), equation (4.10) can be solved to give an 
explicit expression for the best-reply functions: 
t*(t j) 




i, j= 1,2 i# j 
These best-reply functions show that the optimal response of the ith country to 
an increase in the trade policy of the jth country is to increase its trade policy, 
at: latj = 1/7. As the best-reply functions of the two countries are upward sloping, 
the trade policies of the two countries are strategic complements in the terminology of 
Bulow et al. (1985). Thus, in response to a foreign export subsidy, a country should 
impose a countervailing duty equal to one-seventh of the foreign export subsidy. This 
countervailing duty fraction is smaller than the fraction of one-third obtained by Dixit 
(1988) for segmented markets. Surprisingly, in response to a foreign import tariff, a 
country should increase its export subsidy by one-seventh of the amount of the tariff 
This is in sharp contrast to the results under segmented markets where the optimal 
response to a foreign tariff is to reduce the export subsidy by half the amount of the 
taiiff. 41 
The two best-reply functions are shown in Figure 4.1 together with the iso- 
welfare loci of country one for the symmetric case when both firras have the sarne 
48 Collie (1994) derives the trade policy best-reply functions and the Nash equilibrium in trade policies 
under segmented markets when the domestic country uses an import tariff and the foreign country uses 








Figure 4.2: Trade policy best-reply functions for the asymmetric case 
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marginal cost (c, =C2). Along the diagonal, where tj =t25 it can be seen from 
equations (4.3) to (4.6) that prices, output and consumption in both countries are the 
same as under free trade while net imports are equal to zero, m, = m2 = 0. Hence, the 
welfare of country 1 is constant along the diagonal, and this helps to explain the 
unorthodox shape of the iso-welfare loci. When country 1 is a net importer its welfare 
is increasing in country 2's trade policy (export subsidy), and when country I is a net 
exporter its welfare is decreasing in country 2's trade policy (import tariff). The 
asymmetric case, when the firm in country I has a cost disadvantage, Cl > C2 ý 
is 
shown in Figure 4.2.49 
The Nash equilibrium in trade policies is given by the intersection of the two 
best-reply functions as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Using (4.11) to solve for the 
intersection of the two best-reply functions yields the Nash equilibrium trade policies: 
tIN N = tý = (2a - Pc, - Pc2)/9p >0 (4.12) 
In the Nash equilibrium, both countries set their trade policy at exactly the same 
level. 50 Noting that the country with the low (high) cost firm will be a net exporter 
49 In the asymmetric case, when the two firms do not have the same costs, the line where net imports 
are equal to zero is below (above) the diagonal if country one's fn-rn has lower (higher) costs than 
country two's firm. As above, welfare in each country is constant along the line where net imports are 
zero and the welfare of country one is increasing (decreasing) in country two's trade policy if country 
one is a net exporter (importer). 
50 Although not directly comparable, this result can be contrasted with that in de Meza (1986) which 
shows that the country with the low (high) cost firm will give the largest (smallest) Nash equilibrium 
export subsidy in the Brander and Spencer (1985) model under segmented markets. Here, although 
costs do affect the Nash equilibrium trade policies, cost differences do not lead to differences in the 
Nash equilibrium trade policies of the two countries. 
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(importer) in the Nash equilibrium in trade policies since m, = 
P(CI 
- C2) M2 ý leads 
to the following proposition: 
Proposition 4.2. In the Nash equilibrium in trade policies, the country with the low 
cost firm gives an export subsidy which is fully countervailed by the import tariff set 
by the other country. 
Comparing the Nash equilibrium in trade policies with free trade, it is obvious 
that the country with the low cost firm is made worse off while the other country is 
made better off since the net effect of the import tariff and the export subsidy is to 
transfer revenue from the exporting country to the importing country. World welfare 
in the Nash equilibrium is the same as under free trade. This analysis suggests that a 
country like Japan, which is a net exporter of oligopolistic products such as cars, will 
lose in a trade war with a net importer like the United States. 
4.5. Incomplete information about costs. 
In this section, incomplete information about costs is added to the basic model 
presented in Section 4.3. Each firm is assumed to have incomplete information about 
its competitor's marginal cost while each government knows the marginal cost of its 
domestic firm but not that of the foreign firm. 51 In this situation, the trade policy set 
51 The governments may directly observe the marginal cost of the domestic firm or each may design a 
mechanism to ensure that the firm truthfully reveals its costs as in Brainard and Martimort (1996). 
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by a government may provide a signal to the foreign firm about the costs of the 
domestic firm, and the governments will take this signalling effect into account when 
setting trade policy. This game of incomplete information has two stages. At the first 
stage, the two governments each observe the marginal cost of their domestic firm and 
set their trade policy to maximise their national welfare. Then, at the second stage, the 
two firms, having observed the trade policies set by the two govenunents, which they 
use to infer the marginal cost of their foreign competitor, independently and 
simultaneously choose their outputs to maximise their profits. 
The marginal cost of the firm in the ith country, ci, is assumed to be drawn 
from a continuous probability distribution with support on 
[cjL, cýj and with 
unconditional mean ci. The two probability distributions are assumed to be 
independently distributed, and to be common knowledge to both firms and both 
goverm-nents. The expected profits of the firm in the ith country are 
Tc i= Ej 
[(pi 
- Cj)xj 
Itj I where Ej is the expectation operator given the firm's beliefs 
about the marginal cost of the foreign firm. Assuming an interior solution, the first- 
order conditions for the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium are: 
0 nni =Ei pi-ci+xi -ýP-i tj 
axi axi 
) 
-1 2(x - Ei xj tj 2xi + ßti - ßtj - 




In order to solve for Bayesian-Nash equilibrium quantities, it is first necessary 
to determine each firm's expectation of its competitor's output, Ei(xjltj) . Taking 
expectations of the two firms' first-order conditions, using the common knowledge 
assumption, then solving the two simultaneous equations for the expected outputs 
yields: 
E, (xj tj =2(, (x - 2PCj + PC^i) 3 
+ P(tj - ti) i, j= 1,2 i#j (4.14) 
where ci = Ci (ti) = Ej 
(ci ýtj) is the jth firm's expectation of its competitor's 
marginal cost conditioned on the trade policy set by the government of the ith country. 
Substituting (4.14) into (4.13), then solving for the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium 
outputs of the two finns yields: 
Xi = -1 
(2a 
- 3pci - PC^i + 2pýcj) + P(ti - tj) j=1,2 i#j 
(4.15) 
3 
Using these outputs in the inverse demand functions (4.1) gives the prices in the two 
countries: 
(2a+ 3pc, - Pý + 3pcj- Pý 
)+ l(ti- tj) Pi 6p 
Ci Ci 2 
i, j=1,2 i#j (4.16) 
130 
Consumption in each country can be found by using these prices in the demand 
functions of the individual countries: 
Yi (4oc- 3 Pci + PO -3 Pcj + pa 
)+ (t, 
- tj) Ci Ci 62 
i, j= 1,2 i# j (4.17) 
Net imports in each country are given by the difference between domestic 
consumption and domestic production in each country, hence: 
Mi =#- 
3p 
ti - tj -mj ij = 1,2 i #j (4.18) 2 
(C' + C' - cj - cj) 2( 
As in Section 4.3, the welfare of the ith country is given by the sum of 
consumer surplus, the profits of the domestic firm, and government revenue. Using 
equations (4.15) to (4.18) to evaluate the expected welfare of the ith country, 
Wi (tj, cj, - ci) , yields: ci; tj, cj, 
Wi =1 Ei 
[32(X2/ß 
- 72(xci - 8(xc^i + 16(xc-j + 24at, - 24(xtj + 45ßci2 72 
+18pcici - 18pcicj - 18pcic^j - l8pciti + 54pcitj + 5pc^ý - 18pcicj 
2 
-2pcicj + 6pciti + 30pcitj + 9pcj + 18pcjc^j + 18pcjti - 54pcjtj 
-7pc^2 - 30 cjti - 6pc^jtj - 63pd +1 Sptitj + 45ptý (4.19) i 
Pý IiI 
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where i, j=1,2 and i: # j. Having derived the welfare of the ith country as a function 
of the trade policies set by the two governments, the marginal costs of the two firms, 
and the two firms' beliefs about their competitor's marginal cost, it is now possible to 
analyse the first stage of the game where the two governments set their trade policy. 
4.6. Trade policy as a signal of costs. 
With complete information, the trade policy set by a govemment affects 
national welfare through its direct strategic effect on the outputs of the two finns, but 
with incomplete information there is an additional signalling effect. The trade policy 
set by a government can be used by the foreign firm to infer the marginal cost of the 
domestic firm, and the foreign firra's beliefs about the marginal cost of the domestic 
firm will affect its output decision. The two govemments will take this signalling 
effect into account when they set their trade policies. This section derives the 
separating equilibria of this signalling game when only one country signals the costs 
of its firm while taking the expected trade policy of the other country as given. 52 
To solve for the separating equilibria of this game, assume that trade policy of 
the ith country in the separating equilibrium is given by tj i 
(ci; tj) , where 
ýi is a 
differentiable monotonic function of the domestic firm's marginal cost, ci, and t-i is 
52 This game of incomplete information will also have a number of pooling equilibria and these are 
discussed in the appendix. 
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the expected trade policy of the jth country which is taken as given. In a separating 
equilibrium, tj =ýi 
(ci; tj) must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint that the 
government in the ith country maximises its welfare given the beliefs of the foreign 
firm, and that the beliefs of the foreign firm about the domestic firm's marginal cost 
are consistent with the separating equilibrium strategy. Beliefs are consistent with the 
separating equilibrium strategy if they are formed by inverting the separating 
equilibrium trade policy to obtain ^t hence, the foreign firm can Ci 
(ti; 
j) ; 
correctly infer the domestic firm's marginal cost from the trade policy set by the 
government of the ith country in the separating equilibrium. Thus, the government of 
the ith country will choose ti= ýj(cj; tj) to maximise Wj(tj, cj, -(tj)) where Ci 
Ci (t) =ýit which yields the following first-order condition f -I 






a Wi dai 
aa dt Ci i 
i, j=1,2 i -:; e: i 
(4.20) 
in a separating equilibrium, the firms correctly infer the marginal costs of their 
foreign competitors from the trade policy set by the domestic government, so 
-I the differential equation c, (t) = c, . Using this, and noting 
that dýj / dti = (dý i 
ldci) 
ý 
(4.20) can be rewntten as: 
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dý a Wi / aCi _ 
4a - 14Pci + 10PC-j - 3pti - 15pij 
dci aWilati -3(4a 
-2pcj-2pc-j- 21ptj+3pt-j) 
1,2 i #j (4.2 1) 
The separating equilibrium trade policy function is a particular solution of the 
differential equation (4.21) that satisfies the relevant initial value condition. In 
general, finding an analytical solution to the differential equation would be very 
messy, but is unnecessary since a qualitative analysis of the differential equation will 
yield sufficient information about the separating equilibrium. The first step in the 
qualitative analysis of the differential equation is to plot in (ci, ti) space the locus 
where the numerator is zero (N - 0) and the locus where the denominator is zero 
(D = 0) in Figure 4.3. From equation (4.11), it can be seen that the D=0 locus gives 
the optimal tariff under complete information as a function of the marginal cost of the 
domestic firm, ti*(ci) . These loci are both linear, and intersect where the marginal cost 
of the domestic firm is cio =- (2oc+ 6 Pjj -9 Pti) 
/8 P and the trade policy of the ith 
country is tio =- 
(2a- 2 pej +3 pij)112 P. Noting that the numerator is negative 
(positive) above (below) the N=0 locus and the denominator is negative (positive) 
nil aDove (below) the D=0 locus, it is possible to sign the derivative in (4.21) and hence 
plot a qualitative solution to the differential equation starting from any point in Figure 
4.3. There are two linear solutions of the differential equation for which explicit 
solutions can be obtained by positing a solution of the fonn: 
ý, (c, ) - ý, 
(ci') = k(ci - cio) - Substituting this solution into the differential equation 
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negative solution k= (- 1- V-393)/42 labelled as A in Figure 4.3 and a positive 
solution k= (- I+ N[3--93) 
/42 labelled as B. Also shown is the locus where net 
imports of the ith country are zero ( mi =0), obtained from equation (18) with ý Ci = Ci, 
and it is easily shown that the country is a net exporter (importer) in the region above 
(below) this locus. 
The next step in the qualitative analysis of the differential equation is to 
determine the initial value condition that selects the particular solution. It turns out 
that there are three distinct cases to be considered depending upon the cost 
parameters, but two of these cases have already been analysed by Collie and Hviid 
(1993,1999) under segmented markets and will be considered only briefly in this 
thesis. 
In the first case, illustrated in Figure 4.3, the distribution of marginal cost is 
H HX 0 
such that ci = ci < ci so that the ith country is always a net exporter as in Collie 
and Hviid (1993). Below the N=0 locus, the numerator in (4-2 1) is positive so the ith 
country's welfare is decreasing in the beliefs of the foreign firm about the domestic 
firm's marginal cost, aWj1ac^j < 0; hence, the domestic government would like the 
foreign firm to believe that the domestic firm has low costs and the worst beliefs for 
the government are when cýj = c; "x - When ci = cý', since the true marginal cost of the 
domestic firm will be revealed in the separating equilibrium, there is no incentive for 
the government to set any export subsidy other than the optimal export subsidy under 
complete information; hence, the initial value condition is that ýj(c; 'ff)= ti*(c; "x). 
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Starting from the initial value condition at X there are two possible solutions, I and 11, 
shown in Figure 4.3, but the second order condition for welfare maximisation can be 
used to eliminate 11.53 Therefore, the unique separating equilibrium of this game is 
given by the solution with a negative slope and labelled as I in Figure 4.3. Inspection 
of Figure 4.3 shows that the export subsidy in the separating equilibrium is larger than 
the optimal export subsidy under complete information, represented by the D=0 
locus. As in Collie and Hviid (1993), the government signals the competitiveness of 
the domestic firm by using an export subsidy that is larger than the optimum under 
complete information. 
In the second case, illustrated in Figure 4.3, the distribution of marginal cost is 
such that ciL = c; w > cio so that the country is always a net importer as in Collie and 
Hviid (1999). Above the N=0 locus, the numerator in (2 1) is negative so the ith 
country's welfare is increasing in the beliefs of the foreign firm about the domestic 
firm's marginal cost, aWlaý > 0; hence, the goverriment would like the foreign firm Ci 
to believe that the domestic firm has high costs and the worst beliefs for the 
government are when ý= LM. N)Vhen Ci = CiLm, since the true marginal cost of the Ci Ci 
domestic firm will be revealed in the separating equilibrium, there is no incentive for 
the government to set any tariff other than the optimal tariff under complete 
information; hence, the initial value condition is that ýj(cjLm)= t*(ci"). Starting 
from the initial value condition at M in Figure 4.3 there are two possible solutions 
" The second-order condition for welfare maximisation is derived in Collie and Hviid (1993) 
following Mailath (1987). 
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labelled as III and IV but, as above, the second order condition for welfare 
maximisation can be used to eliminate IV. Therefore, the unique separating 
equilibrium of this game is given by the solution III in Figure 4.3. Inspection of 
Figure 4.3 shows that the tariff in the separating equilibrium is smaller than the 
optimal tariff under complete information, represented by the D=0 locus. As in 
Collie and Hviid (1999), the govenunent signals the uncompetitiveness of the 
domestic firm by using a tariff that is smaller than the optimum under complete 
information. 
In the third case, illustrated in Figure 4.3, the distribution of marginal cost is 
such that cio E=- [ciL, cý] so the country can be either a net exporter or a net importer 
depending upon the costs of the domestic firm. The previous two cases both satisfied 
the conditions required for the existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium in 
Mailath (1987), but belief monotonicity is not satisfied in this case since t9Wj/i9ý. <0 Ci 
below the N=0 locus and a Wi laý >0 above the N=0 IOCUS. 
54 
In this case, the worst Ci 
beliefs for the government are when c-, = ci' where there is actually no incentive to 
signal since a Wjlaý = 0; hence, the domestic government will set the optimal trade Ci 
policy under complete information and the initial value condition is that 
ý, (c, ) = ti* 
(ci') 
= tio. The two solutions that satisfy the initial value condition are the 
linear solutions labelled as A and B in Figure 4.3. In this case it is not possible to use 
the second order condition for welfare maximisation to eliminate one of the possible 
54 In Mailath (1987), the conditions required for the existence and uniqueness of a separating 
equilibrium in games with a continuum of types are belief monotonicity, type monotonicity, and 
single-crossing. 
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solutions as it is satisfied by both solutions. However, it can be shown that A, ýA( C ii 
Pareto dominates B ýB( C )ý since it yields higher welfare for all values of marginal ii 
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Since B can be ruled out by Pareto-dominance, the unique separating 
equilibrium is given by A in Figure 4.3. This seems to be intuitively reasonable as the 
separating equilibria in the other two cases both converge towards A. Inspection of 
Figure 4.3 shows that the govennnent uses a larger (smaller) export subsidy (import 
tariff) than the optimum under complete information, represented by the D=0 locus. 
Thus, the results in all three cases can be summarised by the following proposition: 
Proposition 4.3. The export subsidy (import tariffi in the separating equilibrium is 
larger (smaller) than the optimal export subsidy (import tariffi under complete 
information. 
The intuition for these results requires an understanding of the marginal costs 
of signalling. In this model, the marginal cost of signalling for the country is the 
marginal welfare loss from setting a trade policy that deviates from the optimum 
under complete information, lWilati I. Figure 4.4 shows the marginal welfare effect 
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Figure 4.4: The marginal cost of signalling 
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of trade policy as a function of the domestic firm's cost when trade policy is larger 
than the optimum, tj > t: so a Wi lati < 0, and when it is smaller than the optimum, 
t, t: so aWilati > 0. As the domestic firm's cost increases, the main effect is to 
reduce the profit-margin of the domestic firm thus weakening the profit-shifting 
effect, and thereby reducing the marginal welfare gain from using trade policy, 
a2W 
ilaciati < 
0. Thus, the marginal cost of signalling with a trade policy below 
(above) the optimum is decreasing (increasing) in the domestic firm's cost, and is 
lowest when the domestic firm has the highest (lowest) possible costs. 
When the country is a net exporter, the govenunent would like the foreign firra 
to believe that the domestic firm has low costs as this will lead the foreign firm to 
reduce its output. This increases the welfare of the country since profits are shifted to 
the domestic firm and there is an improvement in the terms of trade. The government 
signals the competitiveness of the domestic firm by setting an export subsidy larger 
than the optimum under complete infon-nation because, in this case, the marginal cost 
of signalling is increasing in the domestic firm's cost. When the country is a net 
importer, the government would like the foreign firm to believe that the domestic firm 
has high costs as this will lead the foreign finn to increase its output thereby reducing 
the price of imports. This increases the welfare of the domestic country since the 
terms of trade and tariff revenue gains exceed the profit-shifting loss of the domestic 
fin-n. The government signals the uncompetitiveness of the domestic firm by setting a 
tariff smaller than the optimum under complete information because, in this case, the 
marginal cost of signalling is decreasing in the domestic firm's cost. 
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4.7. Simultaneous signalling game 
Having derived the separating equilibrium of this signalling game with the 
expected trade policy of the other country taken as given, it is now possible to solve 
the separating equilibrium of the simultaneous signalling game when both 
governments use trade policy as a signal of their firms' costs. As both countries 
simultaneously set their trade policy at the first stage of the game, they will only 
observe the other country's trade policy after they have set their own trade policy. 
Therefore, the two governments must set their trade policy knowing only the expected 
costs of the foreign finn and the expected trade policy of the other country. The 
expected trade policy of the other country is obtained by taking expectations of the 
separating equilibrium trade policy given the distribution of the foreign finn's 
marginal costs. In the separating equilibrium of the simultaneous signalling game, 
each government sets its separating equilibrium trade policy ýj(cj; tj) where its 
expectation of the other country's trade policy is rational; thus, the following 
conditions must be satisfied: 
ti -= ýi 
(ci; tj ) and tj = Ej[ýj(cj; ti)] ij == 1ý 2 i: #j (4.23) 
Since the separating equilibrium trade Policies may be non-linear, it is 
generally not possible to solve explicitly for the separating equilibrium of this 
simultaneous signalling game. However, in the case when the separating equilibrium 
trade policy is linear, tj = to+ k(c. - cý) , where co =- 
(2cc+ 6P- -9 P- 
)/8P 
iII Cj tj 
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to= (2oc- 2p- + 3p- )/12P, and k= (- I- V393)142, an explicit solution can i- Cj tj 
easily be obtained. Taking expectations of the linear separating equilibrium trade 
policy yields the best-reply functions of the two countries in terras of their expected 
trade policies: 
i 6ß ei 
k (a- 4 Pei +3 PZFj) + 
2+ 9k 
t 4p Ci 8j 
i, j=1,2 i#j (4.24) 
These best-reply functions are shown in Figure 4.5. Since the best-reply 
functions are downward sloping, dii Idij = (2 + 9k) /8 -- - 0.3 1, the expected trade 
policies of the two countries are strategic substitutes whereas trade policies were 
strategic complements under complete information. The expected trade policies of the 
two countries in the separating equilibrium of the simultaneous signalling game are 
given by the intersection of the two best-reply functions, and can be obtained by 
solving the simultaneous equations (4.24): 
ts -[4(5a- ßöi- 4ßij)+ 18k(ot+ 3ßij- 4ßöj)] i, j= 1,2 i# j (4.25) i9 ß(10+ 9k) Ci Ci Ci 
Having obtained the expected trade policies of the two countries, these can be 
substituted back into (4.23) to obtain a complete description of the separating 
equilibrium of the simultaneous signalling game. In the symmetric case, where 
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t=tS= ts = 2(oc- Pc-)19 P>0 which is equal to the Nash equilibrium under 12 
complete information when c, = c2 = J. To compare expected trade policies in the 
asymmetric case, subtract the expected trade policy of the jth country from the 
expected trade policy of the ith country, to obtain: 
-S- S 2(2+ 21k) t ii =- i1 30+ 27k Ci 
14(-ý3-93- 3)_ 
ý137- r3-93) (4.26) 
Observing that the coefficient on the righthand side is positive leads to the following 
proposi ion: 
Proposition 4.4. In the separating equilibrium of the simultaneous signalling game, 
the country that has the firm with the lower (higher) expected cost has the higher 
(lower) expected trade policy and will be an expected net exporter (importer). 
This contrasts with the result under complete information in Proposition 4.2 
where both countries set their Nash equilibrium trade policies at exactly the same 
level. '5 
An interesting question about the separating equilibrium of the simultaneous 
signalling game is whether intervention by both governments makes the two countries 
worse off than under free trade. To answer this question, the assumption of symmetry 
55 This result is similar to that in de Meza (1986) under segmented markets and with complete 
information. 
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will be exploited to allow expected welfare under free trade to be compared with 
expected welfare in the separating equilibrium. The assumption of symmetry implies 
that the probability distributions of the two firms' costs are identical with the same 
mean, c, and the same variance, a'. This implies that expected net imports under 
free trade will be zero for both countries; a country will be a net importer if the 
domestic firm's costs turn out to be higher than those of the foreign firm. In the 
separating equilibrium of the simultaneous signalling game, both firms will employ 
the same linear separating strategy, ts = to+ k(ci - ci 
), which implies that expected 
net imports will be zero for both countries so ci = c- and the expected value of trade 
policy is t- = to = 2( a- Pc-) /9 p>0. Since the domestic firm" s costs can be infeffed 
Erom a country's trade policy, the beliefs of the foreign finn are c^j = c, in the 
separating equilibrium. Substituting these values into (4.19) and taking expectations 
yields expected welfare in the separating equilibrium: 
Ws =E Wi 
(tis, ci, ci; tjs, cj, ci) = 
4 (, ()t _ 9p ý 
pe)2+ 44- 36k- 9 
36 
Pa' (4.27) 
Under free trade, both countries set their trade policy equal to zero, 
ti =t2=0, so obviously neither firm can infer the costs of its foreign competitor and, 
hence, the beliefs of both finns are that costs are equal to their expected value, 
C1 =C2=C. Substituting these values into (4.19) and taking expectations, yields 
the 
expected value of welfare under free trade: 
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wF 
= EWi(O, ci, c-; O, cj, ZF) =4 (oc_ 
pc)2+ 
3pCY2 
(4.28) 9p 4 
As a benchmark, it is straightforward to show that expected welfare of a 
country under a-Litarky is: 
wA =3 (a- PC), +3 Pa 8p8 
(4.29) 
Comparing (4.28) and (4.29), it is clear that expected welfare is higher under 
free trade than under autarky so there are gains from trade for both countries with 
incomplete information. 56 To compare expected welfare under free trade with 
expected welfare in the simultaneous separating equilibrium, subtract (4.28) from 
(4.27) and recall that k= (- I- V-393) 
/42: 
w S_ WF= 17- 36k- 9k 
2 
Pa 2- 1553+ 83, r393 .2>0 36 3528 
(4.30) 
This is unambiguously positive which leads to the following surprising and 
counterintuitive proposition: 
Proposition 4.5. In the symmetric case, both countries gain from trade and the 
56 Note that the mean and variance terms are both larger under free trade than under autarky. The 
difference in the means is due to the pro-competitive gain from trade whereas the difference in the 
variances represents the gain from specialisation when costs differ. 
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expected weýfare of both countries is higher in the separating equilibrium than under 
ftee trade. 
There are two reasons for this at first surprising result. Firstly, under free trade 
neither firm gains any information about the costs of its foreign competitor whereas in 
the separating equilibrium the true costs of both firms are revealed. In the separating 
equilibrium, when a firm learns that its competitor has higher (lower) than average 
costs it will expand (contract) its own output. Secondly, in the separating equilibrium, 
the finn with the lower cost will receive a large export subsidy while the finn with the 
higher cost will be protected by a small tariff. Both of these effects will increase 
worldwide efficiency compared to free trade since they lead the firm with the lower 
cost to expand its output and lead the firm with the higher cost to contract its output. 
Thus, intervention by both govenunents leads to greater specialisation according to 
comparative advantage and an increase in the expected welfare of both countries. That 
both countries gain is somewhat paradoxical since each government is motivated by 
the profit-shifting and rent-extracting arguments for intervention, both of which are 
usually beggar-my-neighbour policies. 
In the symmetric case, the efficiency gains from increased specialisation in the 
separating equilibrium are divided equally between the two countries but, with cost 
asymmetries, the gains will not be equally divided. In the Nash equilibrium with 
complete information, the country with the low cost firm was worse off than under 
Eree trade while the other country was better off. Similarly, although there will be a 
worldwide efficiency gain in a separating equilibrium with cost asymmetries, the 
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country with the low expected cost firm may be worse off than under free trade while 
the other country will undoubtedly be better 0 ff . 
57 
4.8. Conclusions 
A model of strategic trade policy under integrated markets has been presented 
and optimal trade policies have been derived under assumptions of both complete and 
incomplete information. With complete information, it has been shown that the 
optimal policy is an import tariff (export subsidy) when a country is a net importer 
(exporter). In the Nash equilibrium in trade policies, the country that has the firm with 
the lowest cost gives an export subsidy which is fully countervailed by the import 
tariff of the other country. The introduction of incomplete information about the costs 
of the two firms adds an incentive for both governments to use their trade policy as a 
signal of their domestic firm's cost. As a result of this signalling effect, the export 
subsidy (import tariff) in the separating equilibrium is larger (smaller) than the 
optimum under complete information. In the simultaneous signalling game, the 
country that has the finn with the lower (higher) expected cost will have the higher 
(lower) expected trade policy in the separating equilibrium. When both firms have the 
same expected cost, expected welfare in the separating equilibrium is higher than 
under free trade and both governments gain from intervention in the simultaneous 
signalling game. 
57 Obviously, the possibility that country with the low expected cost firm will lose is most likely when 
the variance of costs is small. 
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The last result is the most significant result in this chapter since it provides a 
rare example where non-cooperative trade policy setting leads to higher welfare for 
both countries than under free trade. Intervention by both governments results in the 
true costs of the two firms being truthfully revealed with the more efficient firm 
receiving a large export subsidy and the less efficient being protected by a small tariff. 
Compared to free trade, this leads to an expansion (contraction) of the more (less) 
efficient firm and a welfare gain from increased specialisation according to 
comparative advantage. Intervention can increase welfare because imperfect 
competition and incomplete information do not allow the full gains from comparative 
advantage to be exploited. 
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Appendix 4: Pooling versus separating strategies 
Obviously, the simultaneous signalling game analysed in this paper has a 
number of pooling equilibria in addition to the unique separating equilibrium. The 
obvious candidate for a pooling equilibrium is for each country to set its trade policy 
equal to the Nash equilibrium trade policy under complete information (4.12) with 
ci =c so that t, =t= 2(ot- PO /9 P, which is the same as the expected trade policy 
in the separating equilibrium, where the equilibrium beliefs are that C^,. = ZF. This 
pooling equilibrium can be sustained by the out of equilibrium beliefs that c^ CL if 
tj <t and c-, = c, ý if tj >t 
To compare pooling and separating strategies, suppose the two countries can 
each choose between these two strategies at the start of the game. Then, the expected 
welfare of the countries in the four possible outcomes can be shown to be: 
Wss= EWi(tis, ci, ci; tjs, cj, cj)= 
4 (cc- PC), 
44- 36k- 9k 
36 
Pa 
Wpp= EWi(t-, ci, c-; t-, Cj, ZF)= 
4 ýc )2+ 3 pU2 
9p 4 
oc- ýc Wsp= EWi(ti", ci, ci; t, cj, c)= 
-s W' = EW(i, c,, c; t, Ii ci, ci) 
4 ýc 
9p 









where the first superscript indicates the strategy of the country under consideration; 
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the second superscript indicates the strategy of the other country; P denotes pooling; 
and S denotes separating. Note that welfare in the pooling equilibrium is the same as 
welfare under free trade (4.28). Comparing the expected welfare of a country when it 






23- 12k- 63k 2 
72 
23- 12k- 63k 2 
72 
243+ 
f3- 9-3 pCT2 
336 
2 43+ V39-3 p(Y2 >0 
336 
(A4.2) 
Since these are both positive, separating dominates pooling whatever the 
strategy of the other country, therefore both countries will choose the separating 
strategy and the outcome will be the separating equilibrium; this leads to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition A4.1. In the symmetric case, for both governments, the separating 
strategy dominates the pooling strategy and the outcome will be the separating 
equilibrium. 
The pooling equilibrium can be ruled out as a reasonable outcome of this game 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, as Proposition A4.1 makes clear, for each country the 
pooling strategy is Pareto-dominated by the separating strategy. Secondly, the out of 
equilibrium beliefs supporting the pooling equilibrium are unreasonable since a 
country that sets a trade policy larger (smaller) than the pooling equilibrium tariff is 
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assumed to have high (low) costs even though such a country would have the least 
incentive to set this trade policy. 
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Chapter 5. 
Trade Bloc Formation under Integrated Markets 
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5.1. Introduction 
This chapter combines the two central themes of this thesis, by introducing the 
assumption of integrated markets and the trade policy instrument introduced in the 
previous chapter into two models of trade bloc formation. These models are otherwise 
similar to the two models presented in Chapter 2. Countries are assumed to be 
symmetric, and in the first model, presented in Section 5.2, firms have common 
constant marginal costs. The second model, presented in Section 5.3, assumes that 
membership of a larger trade bloc results in a reduction in a firm's marginal cost. As 
explained earlier in Chapter 2, this could be as a result of cheaper inputs after the 
Ilu . bolition of tariffs between partners in other industries, hartnonisation of standards or 
the promotion of research joint ventures. 
The change from segmented markets to integrated markets, and the associated 
change in trade policy from a simple tariff to a combined tariff and export subsidy, 
has a major impact on the outcome of the model. Both models presented in Chapter 2 
had equilibrium structures in which two trade blocs formed, the first of which was 
larger and had higher levels of welfare for its members. In this chapter, the result from 
the model with common costs is that the structure of trade blocs has no effect on 
welfare. With declining costs, if two trade blocs forra then a representative country 
belonging to the small bloc is actually better off than a member of the larger bloc. 
Hence the change from segmented to integrated markets is clearly highly significant. 
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 5.2 considers a model of 
trade bloc formation under integrated markets in which each country contains a single 
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firm with common, constant marginal cost. It is shown that, under the assumptions of 
the model, tariffs and welfare are independent of the size of trade blocs. In Section 5.3 
the model is adapted so that costs fall as membership of a trade bloc increases. It is 
shown that when the world is divided into two trade blocs, the trade blocs will set 
equal trade policies. Thus the large (relatively low cost) bloc will set an export 
subsidy which is fully countervailed by the import tariff set by the smaller bloc. It is 
also shown that the grand coalition, in which all finns belong to a single trade bloc in 
which all firms have the lowest attainable marginal cost, will not be an equilibrium 
for a large range of parameter values. There is in these cases an incentive for a group, 
containing less than half of the total countries in the world, not to join the grand 
coalition and to form a separate trade bloc. The result that a country would never want 
to be in the larger of two blocs is initially surprising and contrasts with results found 
under segmented markets, but can be explained by considering the effect of the trade 
policy instrument on goveniment revenue. Govemment revenue is positive for an 
importing bloc, which sets a positive import tariff, but negative for an exporting bloc, 
which pays a subsidy on all exports. Thus the trade policy instrument used effectively 
penalises low cost, exporting blocs. It is further argued that where countries have an 
incentive to belong to a small trade bloc, the two bloc coalition structure is likely to 
prove unstable and a larger number of small blocs is likely to form. Finally, Section 
5.4 contains conclusions and some suggestions for further research. 
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5.2. Model with constant costs 
This section develops a model of trade bloc formation under integrated 
markets. The formation of trade blocs is modelled as a noncooperative sequential 
game, similar to Bloch's (1995) model of endogenous formation of associations in 
oligopolies, Yi's (1996) model of endogenous trade bloc formation with unanimous 
regionalism and the segmented markets model in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Countries 
are indexed i= 1ý 2,..., n. One country, i, is selected as the initiator and proposes an 
association, A(i), consisting of a subset of the countries in the world. 58 All prospective 
members of association A(i) respond in turn, and the association is only formed if all 
these countries agree. In this case the country outside this association with the lowest 
index number is chosen as the new initiator. If a prospective member of A(i) rejects 
the offer, it becomes the initiator in the new round. The game has an infinite horizon 
and countries do not discount payoffs. In the case of an infinite play of the game, all 
countries receive a payoff of zero. The process continues until an association structure 
emerges, which is a partition of all the countries in the world into disjoint 
associations. 
This game allows for the formation of asymmetric associations, and it is 
possible that in equilibrium countries in one trade bloc would rather become members 
of a different bloc. This situation arises because it is possible for any member of a 
trade bloc to prevent the admission to the bloc of a country which it does not wish to 
have as a member. 
59 
58 Given the symmetry between countries, it can be assumed without loss of generality that country 
1 is 
the initiator. 
59 The reasons for using this solution concept, and possible alternatives, were 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
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Formally, the model can be described as follows. First, the multi-stage game 
of trade bloc fonnation described above is played. Subsequently, trade blocs set their 
trade policies to maximise members' welfare. The trade policy instrument used is an 
import tariff and an export subsidy set at equal rates, as discussed in the previous 
chapter of this thesis. Finally, firms compete in quantities in an integrated world 
market. 
The world consists of n symmetric countries, i=1, ..., n, each of which 
contains one firm producing a homogeneous product. It is assumed that there are no 
transport costs. Using the same notation as in Chapter 2, the countries form customs - 
unions (associations), with country i belonging to association A(i). The associations 
are indexed r=R, with the number of countries belonging to bloc r denoted ar 
Hence the association structure S is given by: 
R 
Sý ODA2, ..., AR) jar =n 
r=l 
(5.1) 
Each trade bloc Ar sets a common external tariff and export subsidy tr. 60 Trade 
between partner countries is not subject to tariffs or subsidies. 
As usual, in analysing this game the final stage is considered first. 
61 Finns are 
assumed to set quantities and each firm has a common constant marginal cost c. 
60 Given the assumption of common marginal costs and symmetry between countries the same trade 
policy would be set regardless of whether customs unions or free trade areas were being considered. 
61 The model presented here is a multi-country extension of the full information model considered 
in 
the previous chapter. 
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Demand in country i is given by the linear demand function yj == cc - Ppi, where yj and 
pi are total demand and price in country i. Under the assumption of integrated 
markets, perfect arbitrage ensures that prices only differ between markets by an 
amount dependent on the trade policies in the markets. Thus pj - tj ý-- Pk - tk ýP* for all 
and k. Hence demand can be written as 
yi = oc -p (p + ti) (5.2) 





P(P* + tj 
j=l j=l 
n 
na - npp py, tj (5.3) 
j=l 
Using the fact that world supply, X, must equal world demand, an expression can be 
derived for p 




where tEt, is the mean trade policy across all countries. Thus the price in 
n j=1 
country i is 
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cc X 
w+ (ti -0 (5.5) np 
The profits earned by the firin in country i are given by 
7ri: -- (pi - Oxi (5.6) 
where xi denotes total sales of the country i finn. The first order condition for profit 
maximisation for the finn in country i is 
Ni 
= Pi -c+ xi -api axi axi 




Substituting the expression for price in equation (5.5) into the first order condition 
gives the output of the finn in country i: 
xi = na - X, - nßc + nß(ti - 1) (5.8) 
Summing across countries yields an expression for total world output: 
X,, =n (a -, 6c) (5.9) 
n+l 
Substituting (5.9) into (5.8) gives the following expression for output in country i: 
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Xi n Pc) + np(ti - t) (5.10) n+ 
The price in country i can be found by substituting (5.9) into (5.5): 
Cc n 
Cn + 1)p 
+ Cn + 1) 
c+ (t' -t 
Substituting this price into the demand equation gives 
Yi =n (oc - PC) - P(ti -0 (5.12) n+I 
Net imports in country i are the difference between demand and output in that 
country, mi =: yj - xi. Thus subtracting (5.10) from (5.12) gives 
-(n 1)p(ti - (5.13) 
It should be noted that for any country i in customs union A(i), all its imports 
(exports) will come from (go to) countries outside A(i). This is because the symmetry, 
both ex ante and in ten-ns of trade policy, between bloc members ensures that they 
will behave identically - that is, all will either be net importers or net exporters. Thus 
all imports (exports) to (from) country i will be subject to the trade policy set by bloc 
A(i). 
161 
Welfare Wi in country i is again taken to be the sum of consumer surplus, 
profits of the home firm and net government revenue: 
Yi 
f((x 
- Pq)dq - py, + 7r, 
0 
=-I)Iý +(P C)Xi + timi 2p (5.14) 
In the second stage of the game, governments set their trade policies to 
maximise welfare given the trade policy of other governments. 62 The optimal trade 
policy for country i is found by solving the following first order condition: 
awi 1p an 
- Yi + (Pi - C) 
axý + xi -ý--i + mi + ti = ati p ati ati ati ati 
(5.15) 
Using equations (5.10) to (5.13), the following expression can be obtained for country 
i's optimal trade policy: 
ti 
(oc - PC) +n (ti _t Pn+1 
(5.16) 
A number of cases are considered below. First, the optimal trade policy is 
derived when only a single trade bloc is active in setting trade policy. Then the Nash 
equilibrium trade policies are derived for the case where the world is divided into two 
62 In the case of free trade areas, each government sets trade policy independently. With customs 
unions, the member governments collectively set a common trade policy. As has already been 
explained, the resulting trade policies are the same in either case. 
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blocs of any sizes. Finally, the optimal trade policy is derived for any country or bloc 
in any trade bloc structure. 
To analyse the first two cases, it is assumed that bloc A,, with a, members, 
sets trade policy tj while all countries outside AI set trade policy t2 (with t2= 0 when 
only one bloc pursues an active trade policy). Thus the mean trade policy i is a 
weighted average of t, and t2, and the difference between bloc A I's tariff and the mean 
tariff is 
t, _ 
(n - a, )(t, - tj 
n 
(5.17) 
Using this expression for the difference between bloc Al's tariff and the mean tariff in 
(5.16), the following expression for the optimal tariff can be derived: 
n oc-pc n-a, ti = (n + 1)(al + 1) .P +1 
t2 (5.18) 
The first result we can obtain using (5.18) is the optimal trade policy for bloc 
A, when no governments outside the bloc are active in setting trade policy. Setting t2 
=0 gives 
n (ot - PC) 
(n -+l)(a, + 1) P 
(5.19) 
This expression is clearly positive, so the trade policy is an export subsidy combined 
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with an import tariff. 63 It can be seen from equation (5.19) that the optimal trade 
policy falls, for given n, as a,, the number of countries in the trade bloc, rises. This is 
due to the fact that as a, rises, the number of firms outside the bloc falls. With a lower 
number of firms to shift profits from there is less incentive to impose a profit-shifting 
trade policy, so the level of this policy falls. 
Using (5.18) and a similar expression for t2 as a function of tj, the Nash 
equilibrium trade policies set by the two trade blocs when both are active are found to 
be: 
tN=n 
foc - PC) 
2 (n + 1)2 p 
(5.20) 
Again, the trade policy is clearly positive, implying an export subsidy and import 
tariff. As a, does not enter into the expression, surprisingly the Nash equilibrium 
trade policy is the same regardless of the sizes of the two blocs. In fact, as is shown in 
the proof of Proposition 5.1 below, this result holds for any number of blocs of any 
size. 
The result that trade policies are independent of bloc size has important 
implications. From (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12) it can be seen that all firms set the same 
output and that price and demand are equal in every country. More importantly, from 
(5.13) it can be seen that net imports in each country are zero, so there is no trade. 
Hence with equal trade policies, welfare is the same as under free trade. 
63 This result is equivalent to that given in Proposition 4.2 for the two-country case. 
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Consequently, the possibility to jointly set trade policy provides no incentive for the 
formation of trade blocs, and bloc formation has no effects. Proposition 5.1 
surnmarises these results. 
Proposition 5.1. Under integrated markets and with common, constant marginal 
costs, trade bloc formation has no effect on trade policy or weýfare. Regardless of the 
bloc structure, no net trade occurs. 
ProoC Equation (5.16) above gives country i's optimal trade policy as a function of 
the mean trade policy set across all countries, f. This mean trade policy can be found 
by taking the sum of tj across all i and dividing by n, giving: 
ti 
n oc - PC 
)2 
n (n +I 
(5.21) 
Substituting this value back into (5.16) yields the same solution for tj as is given in 
(5.20). Hence this is the Nash equilibrium trade policy set by any country, regardless 
of the structure of trade blocs. It can then immediately be seen from equations (5.10) 
to (5.14) that welfare is equal in all countries and net imports are zero everywhere. M 
This result contrasts with the results found under segmented markets, both in 
Chapter 2 and in the previous work on trade blocs mentioned in earlier chapters. In 
Chapter 2 it was shown that there is always an incentive either for global free trade 
(when there are no more than four countries) or for the formation of a trade bloc 
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containing most of the countries in the world (when there are five or more countries). 
Tariffs and welfare are always affected by membership of a trade bloc. Krugman 
(199 1) suggests that the enlargement of customs unions would raise tariffs and reduce 
welfare up to the point where there are three symmetric blocs, while in the model of 
Sinclair and Vines (1994) the enlargement of free trade areas causes tariffs to fall. 
Collie (1997) finds that the enlargement of trade blocs will lower export subsidies and 
raise welfare. In none of the previous work does the change in the size of trade blocs 
have no effect. 
The above results depend crucially on two assumptions in the model: common 
marginal costs and integrated markets. The assumption of common marginal costs 
means that when tariffs are equal, prices are the same in each country. The 
assumption of integrated markets, as opposed to segmented markets, means that when 
goods are homogeneous no net intra-industry trade occurs, and each country can only 
be either an importer or an exporter of any one good. Therefore with common costs 
and equal trade policies no trade will occur, as was shown for the two country case in 
Chapter 4. A change to either of these key assumptions would be expected to alter the 
results. 
Despite the fact that no trade actually occurs in this model, there are still gains 
from potential trade. If each country was an autarky, the firm producing in each 
country would be able to choose its monopoly output and price. However in this 
model the possibility of trade forces every firm to produce a larger output at a lower 
price than under autarky. 
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5.3. Model with decreasing costs 
This section adapts the model presented in Section 5.2 by changing the 
assumption made about firms' cost functions. Specifically, it is now assumed that the 
marginal cost of the firm in country i is decreasing in the number of countries which 
are members of A(i), the trade bloc to which country i belongs. This assumption is the 
same as that used in the model with decreasing costs in Chapter 2, and the 
justifications are the same: that is, costs might fall due to the falling cost of inputs, 
harmonisation of standards or the encouragement of research joint ventures. 64 
The specific functional form chosen for the marginal cost of firm i belonging 
to association A(i) of size ai is, as in Chapter 2: 
ai 
(5.22) 
Thus it can be seen that ci is decreasing in aj, but the additional effect of each 
subsequent member joining a trade bloc is declining. This functional form is preferred 
to that used by Bloch (1995), ci = ;ý- ýtaj, because of the diminishing effect that 
additional bloc members have on the cost reduction, as discussed in Section 2.3. 
It is now assumed that only two trade blocs may form; that is, if bloc 
AI forms 
with a, members, all the other (n - a, ) countries in the world are members of 
bloc 
64 These arguments were discussed in detail in 
Section 2.3. 
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65 A2 . Other than the change in the firms' costs, this is the only alteration to the model 
presented in Section 5.2. Hence equations (5.2) to (5.5) give each country's demand, 
world demand and prices as before. 66 Profits for the firm in country i are given by: 
IT 




_ tj) _ ý, _ 
ýt 
xi P np n ai 
(5.23) 
for i, j=1,2. Differentiating equation (5.23) with respect to country i's output, xi, 
gives the first order conditions for profit maximisation: 
Xna 
- +--", (ti - tj) - 
Xi 
axi P np n a, np 
(5.24) 
The first order condition for the firin in country i can be used to obtain the following 
expression for its output: 
xi = noc - Xw + 
(n - ai) P(ti - tj) - npX - 




65 From the results obtained later in this section, it seems unUely that such a two-bloc world would 
ever be an equilibrium. However, allowing for a larger number of blocs would greatly complicate the 
analysis as a separate arbitrage condition would be needed 
between each pair of blocs. The assumption 
used here greatly simplifies the analysis, while giving a clear 
insight into what would happen if more 
blocs were allowed for. 
66 Note that in the case with two blocs, t 
a, t, +(n-a, 
) t2 
- This 






- PX') - 2np[t 
wn+I 
Substituting (5.24) into (5.23) gives an expression for output in country i: 
xi =nn_ 
2nl 
Oýt + (n - ai)o(ti - tj) 
n+ ai n+ 
The price in country i can be found by substituting (5.26) into (5.5): 
n 2[t n ai 
j) n+1n+1n ýn + 1)p 
+ ý'+-+ - (ti-t 
Substituting the price in country i into that country's demand equation gives 
Yi = 
2ftt n-ai, (ti_tj) 





Net imports in country i are the difference between demand and output in that 
country, mi = yj - xi. Thus subtracting (5.27) from (5.29) gives 




As before, welfare in country i, Wi, is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, 
profits earned by the home firm and net government revenue, and given by equation 
(5.14). Differentiating Wi with respect to the trade policy tj in each bloc allows us to 
derive a pair of simultaneous equations for the trade policies set by representative 
members of each bloc: 
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Solving this pair of equations yields the following solution: 67 
n ti =t2 ot - PX 
p Jn + 
4a, n 






a, (n - a, 
)(n + 1)2 
(5.32) 
(5.33) 
The most striking aspect of this result is that the trade policies set by the two 
trade blocs are equal, regardless of the size of each bloc. While this might seem 
surprising at first, it is less so when considered in the context of the two country, 
67 Note that setting ýt =0 and substituting c for X, equation (5.33) simplifies to equation (5.20), the 
Nash equilibrium tariff with constant marginal costs. 
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complete information model presented in Chapter 4. There it was shown that where 
two firms with different costs from different countries compete in an integrated world 
market, the country with the low cost fin-n gives an export subsidy which is fully 
countervailed by the import tariff set by the other country. Here there are two trade 
blocs, the larger of which has lower costs than the smaller. Noting from equation 
(5.30) that in the model presented in this section each country in the larger bloc (A,, 
where ar > n12) will be a net exporter, equation (5.33) leads to the following 
proposition : 
Proposition 5.2. "en costs are declining in the number o countries belonging to a !f 
bloc, if the world is divided into two blocs, countries in the larger bloc will be 
exporters. The larger bloc will set an export subsidy which is fully countervailed by 
the import tariffset by the smaller bloc. 
In effect, Proposition 5.2 implies that the result of the two blocs setting their 
optimal trade policies, compared to the case where the same two blocs are formed but 
governments are passive, is simply a transfer of government revenue. The larger, 
more efficient bloc sets an export subsidy, the entire amount of revenue raised by 
which is transferred to the governments in the other bloc via its import tariff. Thus 
countries in the efficient bloc are effectively penalised for their lower costs. This 
effect is crucial in the results on optimal bloc size which follow. 
Using the fact that the two blocs set offsetting trade policies, the following 
simplified expressions can be obtained for output, prices, demand and net imports in a 









(5.35) (n +n+n+ 
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Mi =n_2 ýýt (5.37) 
(a,. 
An interesting point to note in the above equations is that price and demand in each 
country are unaffected by the size of the trade bloc to which that country belongs. 
This is a direct consequence of the arbitrage condition for integrated markets: prices 
can only differ between countries due to differences in trade policies, but as each bloc 
sets its trade policy at the same level in equilibrium, price, and therefore demand, in 
each country is the same. Meanwhile, as expected, output is increasing in the number 
of countries belonging to a trade bloc. This is because of the cost reducing effect of 
each additional bloc member. Consequently net imports decline as bloc membership 
rises; the smaller bloc will always import from the larger bloc, or if the two blocs are 
of equal size there will be no trade. 
Now that optimal trade policies have been found for any bloc size, the final 
stage of the analysis is to solve for the optimal value of a,, the size of the first bloc to 
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form, given that all other countries will join together in a second bloc. Welfare in a 
representative country belonging to bloc AI is given by: 
pX) - 2pg] 
2 [n(oc 
2(n + 1)2 p+ 
n[(oc - ok) + (2a, -n- 
I)pýt] 
a2 (n + 1)2 I 
_ 
(n - 2a, ) gýn'(4a, ' -n- 1) ßg + al (n - a, )[n(et - ßX) + 2ßg] - 4ai'nßgý 
12 0"& 
a2 (n - a, )(n +1)2 1 
Before attempting to find the optimal value of a,, it is useful to consider the effect on 
country i of an increase in ýai on each of the three terms which make up welfare: 
consumer surplus, profits earned by the domestic firm and net goven-iment revenue. 
From equation (5.36) it can clearly be seen that consumer surplus, which is equal to 
Yj 2 /2P, is independent of aj. Hence only profits and governinent revenue need be 
considered when looking at the effect of an expansion of a trade bloc on welfare. The 
profits of the firm in country i clearly increase with ai as marginal cost falls, output 
rises and the price received by the fin-n remains unchanged. However net government 
revenue falls as bloc size increases, at least over some range of aj. The reason for this 
can be seen from equation (5.37), which shows that net imports fall as the bloc grows, 
becoming negative as ai exceeds W2. Thus, considering bloc A,, as a, rises Erom a 
small proportion of n, at first bloc A I's imports decline, meaning tariffs are raised on 
less goods, and then the bloc becomes an exporter, so net government revenue 
becomes negative as these exports are subsidised. 
From the above it can be seen that the effect on welfare of increasing the size 
of a trade bloc could be positive or negative, depending upon whether the positive 
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profit effect is offset by the possibly negative govenunent revenue effect of bloc 
expansion. Thus, in a two bloc world, it is not immediately clear whether a country 
would wish to be in a small bloc or a large bloc. The next stage in finding the optimal 
size of the first bloc to form is to find the derivative of WI, the welfare of a 
representative member of the first bloc to form, with respect to a,, the number of 
members of that bloc, thus giving the following first order condition for welfare 
maximisation: 
dW, Ida, = ja, ýtn(2al - 4a, n + a, n+ 2n 
2- 2a, n 
2+ 
n')(a - PX) 
23232222 
+Pýt(-2a, + 2a I +4an-4a]n+8an+8a, n-2n +5a, n -6an 
-16a, 'n' - 2n' + 3a, n' + 4a, n')j1ja, (n + 1)'(n - a, 
)21 
=0 (5.39) 
It is immediately apparent that this function is not defined for a, =0 or a, = n. The 
first of these possibilities can be ignored, as the welfare of a member of a trade bloc 
with no members is meaningless, but the case where a, =n is the important case of 
the grand coalition, implying global free trade and the lowest possible marginal cost 
for every country. Therefore to find the bloc size which maximises a country's 
welfare it is necessary to first find the optimal size in the range I :!! ý a, :! ý n-1 (only 
integer solutions need to be considered in this model) and then to compare the welfare 







- pX) + (n - 
I)pýL] 2 
rrft 2(n + 1)2 
+ 
n(n + 1)2 
(5.40) 
One result which can be stated immediately is given in the following lemma: 
Lemma 5.1. The size of thefirst trade bloc toform will never be in the range n12 -: 5'al 
n. If the optimal value of a, in the range I -:! ý a, s- n-I is above n12, then all 
countries wouldprefer to be in the grand coalition with a, = n. 
ProoL As has already been noted, consumer surplus is independent of a, and profits 
are strictly increasing in a,. Hence to provýe the lemma it is only necessary to show 
that government revenue is at no point in the range n12: 5 a, <n greater than at a, = n. 
When all countries are in a single bloc, net imports and government revenue must be 
equal to zero as there are no countries outside the bloc to import from or export to. 
From equation (5.37) it is clear that each country in a bloc with W2 members will also 
have zero net imports, while in the range n12 < a, <n net imports, and therefore 
government revenue, are negative. 
This leaves two possible outcomes from the model: either all countries form a 
single trade bloc, or the first of two blocs contains less than half the countries in the 
world. Unfortunately it is not possible to find a general algebraic solution to equation 
(5.39), the first order condition for welfare maximisation. However, a range of 
numerical simulations, details of which for the case with n= 100 are given in Table 
5.1 below, show that the optimal value for a, in the range I :! ý a, :! ý n-I may lie below 
or above n12, depending on the values given to the model parameters. Furthermore, 
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when a, < n/2, welfare for country i can be either higher or lower when it belongs to a 
bloc of this optimal size than under free trade. In many of the numerical examples 
considered, it is found that in a world consisting of not more than two trade blocs a 
country's welfare is maximised by being in a bloc containing less than half the 
countries in the world. 
68 
The first row of Table 5.1 provides a benchmark case, with cc = 10, ý, =I and 
ýt = 1. Each of the other rows changes one of these parameter values. 69 For many of 
cc ýt a, W, Wft 
10 1 29 106.842 40.5041 
50 1 1 30 1243.76 1200.38 
100 1 1 30 4870.47 4900.01 
1000 1 1 33 489233 498951 
100000 1 1 65 4.99941 x 10 
9 4.99941 x 10 
10 0.001 1 29 116.139 49.9929 
10 5 1 29 79.4188 12.5076 
10 1 5 29 1719.34 40.7323 











Table 5.1: Some numerical exampLes 
68 In Table 5.1, different values of a, X and pi are considered, with P normalised to 1. The values of aI 
given in the table are the integer values which maximise the welfare of the first bloc to form. The value 
of W, in each row is the value of a representative country in the first bloc to form, while WFTgives the 
welfare of a representative country under global free trade. 
69 Note that some restrictions on parameter values are implied by the model. For instance, to ensure 
positive output for all values of a, it is necessary 
(but not sufficient) that a>X+ pi. 
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the examples in the table, it can be seen that a, < W2 and W, < Wft. However, for high 
values of cc and for low values of ýt this is not true. For the case with cc =: 100000 and 
the case with ýt = 0.001, the optimal value of a, is greater than W2. It then follows 
directly from Lemma I that the grand coalition is sustainable. For the cases where (x = 
100 or 1000, and where ýt = 0.1, aI is less than W2 but Wft can be seen to be larger 
than WI, so again the grand coalition is sustainable. 
At first the result that countries might prefer to belong to the smaller bloc 
seems counter-intuitive, as it implies that there is an advantage in a country belonging 
to the smaller of two blocs which must, due to our assumption about costs, implies 
higher costs for its firin than if the country belonged to the larger bloc. This result 
contrasts with the results of Yi (1996) and Section 2.2 of this thesis with segmented 
markets and common, constant marginal costs, and also the results in Section 2.3 
which used the sarne cost function as has been used in this section. With countries 
setting optimal tariffs but not export subsidies, countries wish to belong to a customs 
union which contains the majority of the countries in the world. However there are 
two assumptions in the model presented in this section which might help to explain 
the different result obtained. The first assumption, which is certainly crucial, is that of 
integrated markets, and the necessary assumption this entails about the nature of the 
trade policy instrument. As explained in Chapter 4, to prevent profitable opportunities 
for arbitrage and to keep markets integrated, the trade policy instrument used by each 
country is a combination of an import tariff and an export subsidy. This means that 
net government revenue will always be positive in the smaller, importing bloc and 
negative in the larger, exporting bloc. In effect, the form of trade policy used in the 
model imposes a penalty on countries with relatively efficient, exporting firms while 
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helping those countries with imports on which to raise tariffs. The second assumption 
which might help explain the result is the form of the cost function used in this 
model, which implies that most of the cost reduction from forming a trade bloc comes 
from the first few partners. An alternative where costs are linearly decreasing in the 
number of bloc members would be likely to increase the incentive for adding more 
members to a bloc, and thus make belonging to a small bloc less likely to be 
desirable. However, as was explained in Section 2.3, the cost function used here is 
thought to be more realistic. 
Given the result that, in a two bloc world, countries wish to belong to the 
smaller bloc, it seems sensible to question whether the assumed behaviour of the 
other countries is reasonable. The model only allows for two blocs, so the (n - a, ) 
countries which are not members of the first bloc to form must all combine in a 
second bloc. However, as the first bloc to form gains ftom its small size, it seems 
likely that other countries would also rather be part of a small bloc rather than 
remaining in the large, exporting bloc. Hence it is unlikely that the coalition structure 
with one small bloc and one large bloc would be sustainable. Instead it seems likely 
that the equilibrium coalition structure would consist of either a number of small trade 
blocs or a world in which no blocs are formed. The results found in this section are 
summarised in Proposition 5.3: 
Proposition 5.3. In the model with decreasing costs, the grand coalition might or 
might not maximise each country's welfare. For a wide range ofparameter values, a 
group of less than n12 countries have an incentive not to join the grand coalition and 
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to form their own trade bloc. The resulting coalition structure is unlikely to be 
sustainable and the emergence offurther small trade blocs is likely. 
Inspection of the results in Table 5.1 shows that the cases where the grand 
coalition is formed are those where the demand parameter cc is high relative to ýt, 
which measures the degree by which firms gain from being in a larger trade bloc. 
Although in such cases the benefit in terms of falling costs from joining a trade bloc 
is small, crucially the gain in tariff revenue from being an importer is also small. This 
again highlights the importance to the results of the assumption of integrated markets 
and the trade policy instrument used. 
5.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has considered two models of -trade bloc formation under 
integrated markets. In the first model, where firms have common, constant marginal 
costs, customs union formation has no effect on countries' trade policies or welfare. 
No trade occurs, regardless of the structure of trade blocs. In the second model, a 
firm's costs are decreasing in the number of countries which are members of the trade 
bloc that finn is located in. When two trade blocs form, the larger bloc is a net 
exporter and sets an export subsidy which is fully countervailed by the import tariff 
set by the smaller bloc. In this model the grand coalition, in which all countries are 
members of a single bloc, is not sustainable for a wide range of parameter values as 
some group of countries, consisting of less than half the total number of countries in 
the world, can gain by not joining the grand coalition but instead forming their own 
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trade bloc. This is likely to lead to further changes in the coalition structure as more 
countries leave the larger bloc. 
As has already been noted elsewhere in this thesis, there has been little 
research conducted on trade policy under integrated markets in general. This is even 
more true when looking at trade blocs under integrated markets, and clearly further 
research would be useful. A first area for future research would be to consider 
alternative cost functions, to see whether the result that countries would like to be part 
of a small trade bloc is robust. The cost function used in Section 5.3 is of a form 
which means most of the cost reduction from joining a trade bloc is derived from the 
first few partner countries, and an alternative that could provide different results 
would be to consider costs which decrease linearly in the size of a trade bloc. Another 
useful area of research would be to formally analyse the case in which more than two 
trade blocs could form. A useful starting point for this analysis would be to present a 
three country model of trade under integrated markets, where the relatively small 
number of countries would mean that the need for a separate arbitrage condition 
between each pair of countries should not be um-nanageable. The general case, with 





This concluding chapter highlights the main results found in this thesis, offers 
some general conclusions and suggests some areas for future research. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a number of new results concerning trade bloc 
formation under segmented markets. Using the basic model in Chapter 2, with 
symmetric countries and common constant marginal costs, it is shown that global free 
trade is preferred by all countries when the world consists of no more than four 
countries. With five or more countries, the world will split into two trade blocs, the 
first of which contains most of the countries in the world and has higher welfare than 
the smaller bloc. The model is extended later in Chapter 2 to include a cost reducing 
effect of trade bloc membership, which is a novel feature in this thesis. With 
segmented markets, this cost assumption does not change the structure of trade blocs. 
Chapter 3 considers the fonnation of trade blocs between countries with different 
market sizes where firms have common constant marginal costs. The main result in 
this chapter is that the formation of a two-country free trade area or customs union 
will always raise the smaller country's welfare, whereas the larger country's welfare 
will generally fall when it joins a free trade area and might fall when it joins a 
customs union. The results in this chapter provide a possible explanation for the 
concessions by small countries on non-trade issues which have accompanied many 
recent trade agreements. 
Chapters 4 and 5 contain a number of results concerning trade policy and trade 
bloc formation under integrated markets. As well as adding to the limited literature on 
integrated markets, these chapters also make it possible to make comparisons between 
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segmented and integrated markets. Chapter 4 presents a two-country model, under 
complete and incomplete information. The main results are: in the Nash equilibrium 
with complete information, the low cost country gives an export subsidy which is 
fully countervailed by the high cost country's import tariff; with incomplete 
information about costs, the signalling effect increases the export subsidy and reduces 
the tariff; and in the simultaneous signalling game, with symmetry, expected welfare 
in the separating equilibrium is higher than under free trade for both countries. The 
model of trade bloc formation under integrated markets with common constant 
marginal costs in Chapter 5 suggests that there is no incentive for trade bloc 
formation, as tariffs and welfare are independent of bloc size. However, when costs 
fall as the size of a trade bloc rises, there is an incentive for trade bloc formation. 
Surprisingly, when global free trade is not optimal, if the world were to divide into 
two blocs, countries belonging to the smaller bloc would be better off than those in 
the larger bloc. 
Although in the two-country model presented in Chapter 4 the analysis of 
strategic trade policy under integrated markets shows few qualitative differences to 
the cage of segmented markets, this is not true when the formation of trade blocs is 
considered. Comparing the results in Chapters 2 and 5 suggests that the 
incentives for 
trade bloc membership are very different under the alternative assumptions. When 
firms 1) marginal costs are unaffected by trade bloc membership, there 
is a clear 
incentive to belong to a large bloc under segmented markets, but no gain from trade 
bloc membership under integrated markets. The two alternative assumptions also 
lead 
to contrasting conclusions about the 
importance of the cost reducing effect which 
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might be associated with trade bloc formation. Under segmented markets, there is no 
effect on the equilibrium structure of trade blocs, although all countries achieve higher 
welfare, whereas under integrated markets the cost reducing effect provides an 
incentive either to move to global free trade or to belong to a (small) trade bloc when 
there would otherwise be no such incentive. 
Although any policy conclusions based on such specific models are at best 
tenuous, it is interesting to consider what the models in this thesis suggest in relation 
to the real world. More specifically, the results in this thesis allow some conjectures to 
be made about what might happen with regard to trade blocs as world markets 
continue to become more integrated. The main conclusion would appear to be that 
there is less incentive to belong to a trade bloc when markets are integrated than when 
they are segmented, and in particular there is less incentive to belong to a large trade 
bloc. When trade blocs have no effect on the costs of firms located in member 
countries, the results in Chapters 2 and 5 suggest that a move from segmented to 
integrated markets removes the incentive to belong to a trade bloc. However there is 
no loss related to belonging to a trade bloc, and consequently no incentive for any 
country to leave a bloc to which it already belongs. This is not true, however, if trade 
bloc membership reduces firms' costs. Comparing the results in Chapters 2 and 5 
shows that in this case, countries move from wanting to belong to a large bloc under 
segmented markets to preferring either global free trade or membership of a small 
bloc under integrated markets. It must be remembered that the difference in the trade 
policy instruments used in the two chapters could be important in reaching this result. 
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One obvious area for future research is to consider further the case of 
asymmetric countries. The model in Chapter 3 made a first step in this direction, but 
made no attempt to derive any results about equilibrium trade bloc structures. Given 
the complexity in finding results where countries are symmetric, it seems unlikely that 
consideration of a general n-country case would be fruitful. However, with specific, 
small numbers of countries it is likely that some interesting results could be generated. 
Chapter 3 takes a first step in this direction by considering a three-country model, but 
finds no incentive for trade bloc formation in the absence of transfers. An interesting 
area for future investigation would be to see how many countries are needed before 
there is an incentive for two or more of them to form a customs union or free trade 
area. 
Another area for future research would be to consider other types of 
asymmetry between countries. The only way in which countries differ in Chapter 3 is 
through a demand parameter, which implies differences in market size. Other 
asymmetries could be introduced on the production side, either by having different 
numbers of firms in different countries or by allowing firms' marginal costs to differ 
between countries. An obvious starting point would be to assume that those countries 
with larger markets also contain more firms. In this case, it is likely that the gains to 
small countries and losses to large countries which arise when they gain access to 
each other's markets would be reduced, and possibly even reversed, with significant 
effects on the overall incentives for trade bloc formation. 
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Throughout the thesis, as well as assuming that every country contains one 
firm, it has also been assumed that the number of firms in the market is unaffected by 
trade bloc formation. However, allowing for free entry and exit would make it likely 
that changes in the structure of trade blocs would also result in changes in the number 
of firms in an industry. For example, in the case of segmented markets, if a country 
was a member of a large trade bloc, with a relatively large 'home' market, the 
profitability of finus located in that country would be increased at the expense of 
firms based outside the bloc. Hence there might be incentives for firms to enter the 
industry in countries belonging to the large bloc or leave the industry in countries 
belonging to the small bloc. 
Finally, it should be noted that global integration is effectively considered as a 
demand side phenomenon in this thesis. The comparison between segmented and 
integrated markets could arise due to a change in firms' perceptions, as they perceive 
the world to have changed from being divided into geographically distinct markets to 
being a single market, but in reality a move to integrated markets is more likely to be 
due to the actions of consumers and arbitrageurs in eliminating price differentials 
between markets. However, globalisation is occurring in production as well as 
consumption, and multinational companies play an increasingly important role in the 
world economy. The effect of trade bloc formation on production, at firm level rather 
than at a more aggregated level, is an area where little research has been done and 
there are likely to be important effects on the location of production resulting from 
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